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Abstract 
 
South Africa has a significant housing shortage and even though the government 
has provided in excess of three million subsidised houses to beneficiaries since 
1994, a shortage of 2.1 million units still exists. While households earning less 
than R3 500 qualify for a fully subsidised house, the most affordable newly built 
house on the market in Johannesburg is only affordable to households earning 
about R14 300. Therefore, a gap in the housing market exists between those too 
rich to qualify for a full housing subsidy and those too poor to access formal 
bonded housing.  
A partial subsidy, called the Finance-Linked Individual Subsidy Programme 
(FLISP), is available to households earning less than R15 000 to help them access 
housing in the formal market. Although private developers are developing houses 
affordable to households earning less than R15 000, uptake of the subsidy has 
been limited. Johannesburg has roughly 385 000 households in the gap market.  
This study seeks to establish what role the private sector currently plays in 
providing gap housing in Johannesburg. A qualitative study was done by 
interviewing various developers who are involved with gap housing 
developments, using semi-structured interviews and email correspondence. 
Furthermore, this study aims to establish what perceptions developers have of the 
market, what difficulties they face, what barriers exist to entering the market and 
how private companies help their employees in accessing gap housing.  
It was found that developers have a positive view of the market. Many echoed the 
view that the market in Johannesburg is vast, growing and that there are plentiful 
opportunities. There are, however, factors that make delivering less expensive 
houses more difficult. Bulk service contributions, especially, are becoming 
excessive, while the time taken to approve new townships can lead to unnecessary 
holding costs. Poor access to development finance is seen as prohibiting new 
developers from entering the market. Developers are aware of only a handful of 
private companies involved with assisting their employees to access gap housing.  
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Although there are numerous gap housing developments in Johannesburg and 
many more planned, relatively few FLISP subsidies have been granted. These 
subsidies are tied to access to traditional mortgage finance. Fewer and fewer 
mortgages in the gap housing range have been given in recent years and if more 
houses are to be delivered, housing finance should be made more accessible to 
lower income earners.  
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Nomenclature 
 
Bulk contributions Also known as engineering services contribution. A 
financial contribution payable by an applicant to a local 
authority for the use of their bulk, or external, engineering 
services. Typically financed by the local authority using a 
development contribution from the developer. 
Bulk services Engineering services that are typically the responsibility of 
the local authority to provide. This includes water 
networks, electrical installations, sewerage services roads 
and storm water as well as the links required to connect 
these services to a new development.  
Development charge A collective name for the bulk and link contributions. Also 
known as a Capital Contribution, Bulk Infrastructure 
Contribution Levy or internationally as an Impact Fee.   
Internal services Infrastructure inside the boundary of the development that 
services the development. Typically financed by the 
developer. 
Link contribution Fee, typically financed by the developer, to cover the costs 
of the services required to connect the bulk services with 
the internal services of a development. 
Residential 3 (Res3) Residential property development zone that permits a 
density of between 21 and 40 dwellings per hectare, 
typically in townhouse sectional title format. CoJ allows a 
50% coverage.  
Section 82 certificate A certificate from the municipality that states that all 
conditions have been met regarding the establishment of the 
township and arrangements have been made for installation 
of services. This signifies that transfer of stands has been 
authorized and building plans accepted. 
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1. GAP HOUSING IN JOHANNESBURG – AN 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter serves as an introduction to the topic and gives a brief background to 
the research and discusses both the problem statement and the aim of the study. 
Furthermore, the main research question and sub-questions are presented and an 
introduction to the research method, aimed at addressing the research questions, is 
discussed. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the scope of research and 
the report structure. 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Worldwide urban populations are growing quickly and it is estimated that by 
2030, 50% of Africa’s population will be city dwellers, up from roughly 40% in 
2010 (KPMG 2012). Between 2010 and 2015 the average rate of urbanization in 
Africa was 1.4% (Sy 2016). Comparatively, South Africa (SA) has a higher 
urbanized population (65% in 2015) and the rate of urbanization between 2010 
and 2015 was 1.58% (Central Intelligence Agency 2016).  
South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world in terms of income 
distribution, with only Namibia and the Seychelles having higher Gini-
coefficients (Keeton 2014). Furthermore, the country has an unemployment rate 
of 27%, one of the highest in the world (Wired World 2017). The above 
mentioned economic issues, coupled with the growth in the urban population and 
the country’s history of apartheid, has led to a housing shortage that has only 
grown since the advent of democracy (Wilkinson 2017). Although the state has 
delivered over three million houses and one million serviced sites since 1994, the 
housing backlog has grown from 1.5 million units in 1994 to 2.1 million units in 
2015 (ibid.). In 2010, roughly 13% of the population were living in informal 
settlements (Housing Development Agency 2013). 
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Given that access to housing is enshrined as a right in the South African 
Constitution (Republic of South Africa 1996), the government started an 
aggressive housing provision program in 1994, but has been unable to eliminate 
the housing backlog (Tomlinson 1997). The initial housing policy focussed on 
providing beneficiaries with a serviced plot and a small ‘starter’ house (ibid.). 
Various shortcomings of this policy led to numerous revisions of the policy that 
ultimately allowed for a more dynamic housing product suiting a varying array of 
housing needs (Tomlinson 2007). The result of these revisions is a new housing 
policy that includes subsidies for full houses, social housing, rural housing and a 
wide array of housing types. One detrimental effect of this new policy has been a 
significant decrease in the rate of housing delivery, mainly due to houses having 
higher specifications and an increase in the overall complexity of housing projects 
(ibid.).  
The need for housing was not only limited to the low-income population, but also 
to those too rich to receive fully subsidised housing and too poor to access 
housing on the established formal market. This is called the gap housing market. 
The next section will delve into the gap market in the South African residential 
space and also discuss the problem statement of this report.  
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
The initial post-1994 housing subsidy made provision for a free small house on a 
plot, commonly known as a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
house. This was replaced in 2004 by the so-called ‘Breaking New Ground’ (BNG) 
house, a slightly larger and better fitted version of the RDP, available only to 
households earning less than R3 500 (Tomlinson 2007).  
For those earning above R3 500, however, the BNG house was not an option and 
a gap in the market soon developed, including those who earn too much to be 
eligible for a BNG unit, but too little to afford a house on the traditional market, 
typically financed using bank loans. This so-called gap market, is currently 
roughly defined as houses costing between R180 000 and R500 000 and incomes 
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ranging between R3 500 and R18 000 (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in 
Africa 2016).  
Figure 1 illustrates the gap market. A detailed definition of the market is presented 
in Section 2.3.1. 
 
Figure 1: The South African housing continuum 
(Source: Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa 2016) 
 
In order to address the gap in the market, government introduced the Finance-
Linked Individual Subsidy Programme (FLISP), designed to act as a demand-side 
subsidy (Nene 2017). This subsidy gets paid as a once-off amount, ranging 
between R20 000 and R87 000, to a mortgage provider and the amount is 
determined by the household income, reducing as income increases (National 
Housing Finance Corporation 2015). The subsidy is available to households 
earning between R3 500 and R15 000 and is aimed at assisting households in the 
gap income range to access housing that is not fully subsidised or state provided 
(Cirolia 2016). 
The introduction of the FLISP-subsidy has created an opportunity for the private 
sector to enter the market as housing developers, although at the higher end of the 
lower-income market. The private sector is, by its very nature, profit-seeking and 
with the exception of contractors, the low-cost housing market presents fewer 
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opportunities for profit-making than at the higher end of the market. However, the 
FLISP subsidy changes this and private developers have started providing for the 
gap market.  
The City of Johannesburg (CoJ) is situated in the north-east of South Africa close 
to the administrative capital Pretoria (see Figure 2). Little data is available on the 
shortage of houses in the gap market in Johannesburg. According to the mayor of 
the City of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba (2017), the city has a total housing 
shortage of 300 000. This value corresponds to the number of households living in 
informal dwellings in the City (Statistics SA 2017a).  In Chapter 2, the shortage of 
gap housing units in Johannesburg is estimated as roughly 130 000 units. It is 
clear that Johannesburg has a sizeable housing shortage in the lower-income 
market, while fiscal constraints, among others, keep the city from addressing this 
shortage (McGaffin & Kirova 2016).  
Figure 2: Location of the City of Johannesburg 
(Source: Map data copyrighted OpenStreetMap contributors; Municipal Demarcation 
Board 2013) 
5 
 
Market participation in Johannesburg by well-funded and listed companies 
indicates that there are profit-making opportunities in this segment. However, as a 
portion of total housing units, gap housing is tiny – in the 2015/2016 financial 
year only 2253 FLISP subsidies were given nationally, from a total of 153 000 
housing units delivered, while only 818 FLISP subsidies were given in the 
province of Gauteng (Department of Human Settlements 2016; Gauteng Province 
Human Settlements 2016). 
According to the South African Affordable Residential Developers Association 
(2017), the private sector cannot deliver gap and affordable housing on a large 
enough scale and there is a countrywide problem of insufficient supply. 
Furthermore, Kecia Rust (2012 ), executive director and founder of the Centre for 
Affordable Housing Finance in Africa stated:  
“Developers have been shifting their attention for some time to the sub-R500 
000, so-called “gap” market that is increasingly also the focus of the State’s 
attention.  It also means that over time, the profile of our property market is 
shifting dramatically in favour of lower value, still Western-style but smaller 
than 80m2 houses, targeted at the majority of the population.” 
In 2015, the then Minister of Finance, Nhlanhla Nene (2015), stated that ”[i]n 
particular, the FLISP has not attracted much private sector contribution and 
support.” Given the scale of the housing problem in the City and the large sums of 
money being spent on tackling the problem, it is worth investigating the role the 
private sector plays in providing gap housing in Johannesburg.  
 
1.3 Aim of study 
 
This study will be guided by the following objectives: 
 To establish a body of literature showing how gap housing policy and 
projects have developed in South Africa and Johannesburg in particular, 
since 1994. 
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 To determine what role the private sector plays in delivering gap housing 
in Johannesburg. 
 To establish why more houses are not being built in the gap market in 
Johannesburg. 
 To establish barriers to entry and other factors keeping private developers 
from entering the market. 
 To establish in what ways private businesses assist their employees to 
access gap housing. 
 
1.4 Research question 
 
Following on from the problem statement and aims of the research, the main 
research question of this report is: 
What role does the private sector play in providing gap housing in 
Johannesburg? 
 
Sub-question 1 
The number of FLISP subsidies given in Gauteng province has been disappointing 
(GPHS 2015; GPHS 2016). This has been partly due to administrative constraints, 
but also due to insufficient supply. This leads to the following sub-question:  
What keeps the private sector from delivering more gap housing units in 
Johannesburg? 
 
Sub-question 2 
Literature points to availability of land, access to credit and political risk as some 
of the reasons why gap housing delivery has been slow. This author aims to 
establish if there are any other reasons why private sector delivery cannot be 
increased. 
7 
 
What are the challenges faced by the private sector in providing gap 
housing in Johannesburg? 
 
Sub-question 3 
Although CSI spending is not mandated by law, companies are increasingly 
realising that they cannot operate in isolation from the communities they operate 
in and are diversifying their CSI spending (Mail & Guardian 2016). This author is 
interested in whether developers see the CSI landscape as one that can, in any 
way, be leveraged to increase gap housing delivery and whether there are others 
ways in which private sector companies assist their employees to access gap 
housing.  
How can corporate social investment (CSI) contributions, or any other 
interventions, be used by private companies to assist their employees to 
access gap housing? 
 
1.5 Introduction to research methodology 
 
Since this study is descriptive, exploratory and analytical in nature, a qualitative 
study was chosen as a suitable method of inquiry (Creswell 2009). This method 
allows for a flexible approach and for questions to be asked that invoke rich and 
exploratory answers (Mack et al. 2005). 
In-depth interviews were chosen as the main procedure for collecting data, since 
this allowed for personal, interpretive perspectives and elicits in-depth, nuanced 
responses (Mack et al. 2005). Semi-structured interviews were conducted where 
possible and questions were kept open-ended to allow a degree of flexibility to 
pursue themes touched on by the respondent.  
Interviews were conducted with private developers who operate in the gap 
housing market in Johannesburg. Some are involved only with land developments, 
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some only with top-structure developments and others with both. Where face-to-
face interviews were not possible, questionnaires were answered over email.  
The qualitative data gathered was analysed to spot trends and come up with 
answers to the above-mentioned research questions. A detailed discussion of the 
research method is presented in Chapter 3, while the results are presented and 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
1.6 Scope of research 
 
This section discusses the scope of the research done. It defines the section of the 
private sector the research focuses on, the geographical limits of the research as 
well as the financial limits (by defining the gap market).  
According to Urban Landmark (2010) the majority of actors in the private 
residential property sector fall into the following categories: developers, investors, 
formal financiers, micro-financiers, property professionals, landlords, private 
individuals and tenants. While all of these actors play a role in ultimately 
delivering housing, this report will focus on the role of the former.  
The author is based in Johannesburg and as a way to limit the scope of the 
research and facilitate face to face communications with developers; the 
geographic reach of the research was limited to the greater Johannesburg area. 
Figure 3 shows the municipal boundaries of the City of Johannesburg as well as 
the other metropolitan and district municipalities in Gauteng Province. As can be 
seen, the City is in close proximity to the other two large Metropolitan 
Municipalities in Gauteng, namely the City of Tshwane and Ekurhuleni. Although 
the study will focus on the City of Johannesburg, it cannot be viewed in isolation. 
Therefore, the research will encompass areas which serve Johannesburg with 
housing so these could be established right outside the borders of the 
municipality. There is also significant data available about the state of housing in 
Johannesburg and by focussing mainly on the municipal boundaries, the 
collection of data is simplified.  
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Figure 3: Metropolitan and District Municipalities of Gauteng Province 
 
 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality  Sedibeng District Municipality 
 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality  West Rand District Municipality 
 Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality   
 (Sources: Map data copyrighted OpenStreetMap contributors; MDB 2013) 
 
The gap market is defined as households with an income range of R3 501- 
R18 000 (see Section 2.3.1). These households are able to afford houses priced 
roughly R180 000 to R500 000. This research will focus on gap housing as 
defined above and will exclude the fully subsidised and affordable markets.  
As stated above, the term gap market refers to both an income range and a house 
price. This market includes both the new and second hand market. The scope of 
this study will focus predominantly on the new house market, although the second 
hand market is briefly discussed in Chapter 5). 
50 km 
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1.7 Report structure 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that there is a gap in the residential property 
market in Johannesburg, where people earning too much for a full housing 
subsidy, but earning too little to access housing on the traditional market, have 
few options when wanting to buy a new house. Research is needed to establish 
what role the private sector plays in providing gap housing in Johannesburg.  
The literature review commences in Chapter 2, which discusses three main 
themes. Firstly, the role that the private sector plays in providing housing in 
general is discussed. The second section focusses on gap housing, the gap market 
and the how the FLISP subsidy relates. Finally, the chapter looks at the housing 
market in Johannesburg.  
Chapter 3 explains the research method undertaken. The chapter discusses the 
research design, the research population, how data was collected and the method 
for data analysis. Ethical considerations are discussed as well. 
The collected data is presented in Chapter 4 by breaking it into three sections. 
Firstly, the delivery of gap housing by various developers is presented. This is 
followed by a discussion on their feedback regarding barriers to entering the 
market that they have encountered. Lastly, their feedback on some recommended 
interventions that might improve market entry are discussed. An analysis of all 
results is discussed in Chapter 5 and the report ends with a conclusion and 
recommendations in Chapter 6.  
All values presented in the report are in 2017 Rands, unless otherwise stated. This 
is done to simplify comparisons between sources from different years.  
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2. THE STATE OF GAP HOUSING IN JOHANNESBURG –
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter aims at accumulating a body of literature related to gap housing in 
general and in Johannesburg in particular. It also strives to provide the context of 
the research. A brief introduction of the literature is presented in the first section.   
The second section gives a brief international overview of housing and the role 
that the private sector plays as a provider thereof. It also features a section that 
focusses on the private sector in SA. Since no discussion of gap housing 
developers would be complete without mentioning access to finance, this is 
discussed as well. 
The third section covers gap housing in SA. It includes a description of the gap 
market, a brief history of the low-income market in SA, an introduction to the 
FLISP subsidy, gap housing delivery numbers and a discussion on why gap 
housing and the FLISP subsidy has been so poorly adopted.  
The third section looks at housing in Johannesburg and aims to estimate the size 
of the gap market in both SA and Johannesburg. The chapter ends of with the 
conceptual framework and a short summary of the work covered.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The Financial and Fiscal Commission (2012) states that only 12% of South 
Africa’s total housing market is covered by the traditional mortgage market. Other 
sources (Eighty20 2015; Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa 2016) 
estimate the figure to be closer to 14%. Therefore, only a relatively small portion 
of households live in formal bonded houses. The rest of the population is 
dependant, in some way or another, on the state for formal housing, or lives in 
informal housing (FFC 2012). Since the end of apartheid, the state has provided in 
excess of three million houses and over a million serviced sites (Wilkinson 2017).  
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According to the deeds registry, as quoted by The Banking Association of South 
Africa (2017), 6.1 million residential properties were registered in the country in 
2015. Of the three million houses delivered by government, slightly less than half 
were not yet registered on the deeds registry by 2013 (City of Johannesburg 
Department of Housing 2013). Therefore, it can be estimated that of the 7.6 
million formal houses in SA, roughly 40% were delivered by government.  
By 2011 the housing backlog had grown to 2.1 million, from 1.5 million units in 
1994 (Fiscal and Financial Commission 2012). Although the state should be 
applauded for the strides made so far, the housing shortage in the country is 
clearly growing and the rate of delivery is insufficient.   
According to the Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa (CAHF 2016) 
the formal residential market in SA can be divided into four main segments 
according to property value: the subsidy (state-provided) market, the gap market, 
the affordable market and the conventional market. The latter two tend to be 
bonded in some way or another, while the former is only available to households 
earning less than R3 500. The so-called gap market is defined by those households 
earning too much for a subsidised unit and too little to independently enter the 
formal market. An income of roughly R15 200 is required to enter the new market 
unassisted. This market includes properties valued between R180 000 and 
R500 000. Sources estimate that between 23% (Fiscal and Financial Commission 
2012) and 28% (CAHF 2015c) of all households fall into the gap market.  
The Department of Housing introduced the Finance-Linked Individual Subsidy 
Program (FLISP) in 2005, aimed at those households falling in the gap market 
segment (National Housing Finance Corporation 2017). The targeted recipients 
earned between R3 501 and R7 000, but the upper income was revised to R15 000 
in 2012 to include a larger portion of the gap market (Cirolia 2016). The FLISP 
subsidy is dependent on an approved mortgage from a formal finance provider 
and is typically aimed at houses provided by private sector developers at the lower 
end of the cost spectrum (NHFC 2015).  
The number of FLISP subsidies awarded has increased slowly between 2013 and 
2017, both on a national and Gauteng provincial level (DoHS 2014; DoHS 2015; 
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DoHS 2016; DoHS 2017; GPHS 2014; GPHS 2015: GPHS 2016) . However, the 
actual delivery is far short of the targets set (see Section 2.3.4). This indicates that, 
private developers have either increased their housing stock delivery in the gap 
market or the second hand market has started to open up. What is evident, though, 
is that delivery is falling short of what is required.   
 
2.2 Housing and the private sector 
 
This section aims to discuss the role that the private sector plays in providing 
housing. The private sector, of course, is rarely the only housing provider in a 
country. Therefore, the role of the state as housing provider is discussed briefly as 
well.  
The first sub-section briefly discusses the history of housing on a global scale, as 
well as the role of the state and how subsidies are used to facilitate the provision 
of housing. The next sub-section looks at the role that the private sector plays in 
the provision of housing in South Africa and draws comparisons with the state. 
No discussion of housing is complete without mentioning access to housing 
finance. Therefore, the last sub-section discusses the availability of mortgage 
finance in SA. 
  
2.2.1 A brief global history 
 
The latter half of the twentieth century saw a worldwide increase in rural dwellers 
migrating to cities in developing countries (Bertraud 2010). Confronted with 
rapidly growing slum populations in cities, governments started implementing 
national spatial plans and regulating minimum standards (ibid.). The latter 
intervention, especially, has led to the poor struggling to enter the formal housing 
market (ibid.). Some governments also started implementing large scale state-
sponsored housing programs, but mainly due to the high price of land, state-
provided housing tended to be located on the peripheries (ibid.). 
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By the 1970’s there were numerous examples of failed public housing projects 
worldwide (Gilbert 2004; Bertraud 2010). Consequently, development institutions 
based in Washington started advocating for a different approach to the role 
governments play in housing markets (Gilbert 2004).  
The 1970’s and 80’s saw The World Bank pushing more for projects that 
developed land rather than provide finished houses (Stein & Vance 2008; 
Bertraud 2010). These “sites and services” land was meant to be free of subsidies 
and provide a model that the private sector would be able to emulate. In order to 
help make these projects affordable, design standards were often lowered. 
However, the private sector was not allowed to use these lowered (but acceptable) 
standards, and consequently seldom successfully managed to enter the market at 
scale (Bertraud 2010). 
The fall of European socialist economies and market reform in China during the 
late 1980’s and early 1990’s led to an interest in market principles being applied 
to land development and housing supply (Bertraud 2010). In its 1993 report 
Housing – Enabling Housing Markets The World Bank (1993) globalized the idea 
that governments should abandon their earlier roles of housing producers and 
stated that “privatization of housing production should go hand in hand with the 
overall privatization of public sector enterprise” (The World Bank 1993: 90; 
Gilbert 2004: 40). Governments should rather, it was argued, aim at adopting an 
enabling role, incentivise the private sector to become housing providers and 
focus on managing the housing sector (The World Bank 1993; Keivani & Werna 
2001; Ogu & Ogbuozobe 2001; Mukhija 2004). Although this idea has been 
widely criticized, it has also been widely adopted in both the developed and 
developing world (Baken & Van der Linden 1993; Ogu & Ogbuozobe 2001; 
Mukhija 2004). A number of countries, such as Chile, had started adopting this 
approach before the report was released, but it was only after its release that this 
approach became widespread (Mukhija 2004; Gilbert 2004). In Britain, for 
example, a gradual transfer of state-owned social housing to private housing 
associations started in the 1980’s (Berry et al. 2004). Simultaneously, building 
societies and especially banks started entering the lower income market more 
fervently (ibid.).  
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In many developing countries the private sector has now become the main 
provider of housing. In Nigeria, for example, private developers became the 
largest producer of low-income housing stock during the 1990’s and 2000’s (Ogu 
& Ogbuozobe 2001; Ademiluyi & Raji 2008). Similarly, after decades of state and 
employer provided housing, the bulk of China’s urban housing needs are now 
provided by the private sector (Bertraud 2010). It is worth noting, however, that 
the private sector in that country is often criticized for not providing sufficient 
housing at the lower end of the scale. (ibid.).  
This section has so far discussed how the worldwide norm has become for 
governments to act more as enablers as opposed to providers of housing. Angel 
(2000) suggests that subsidies, and especially targeted demand-side subsidies, can 
successfully be used as an enabling tool by governments. South Africa offers a 
mix of supply-side subsidies (like BNG) and demand-side subsidies (like FLISP) 
(Nene 2015), each aimed at targeting a different market failure. However, the 
impact of the latter subsidy has been limited (ibid.). 
South Africa is not the only country with an affordability gap in the housing 
market. Numerous other countries have implemented similar capital credit-linked 
subsidies (such as FLISP) whereby beneficiaries are assisted to afford housing 
delivered by the private sector. These countries include Chile, Colombia and 
Costa Rica (Gilbert 2004; Stein & Vance 2008). Developed countries such as 
Canada and the USA have affordability gaps as well (Wallace 1995; Tsenkova & 
Witver 2011; McCarty, Perl & Jones 2014). The gap in the USA housing market 
is, although significantly smaller than in SA by market share, still large enough to 
warrant concern (Wallace 1995). The USA has a number of state-provided 
interventions to help lower-income earners to access housing. Very low-income 
households predominantly make use of rent vouchers where rent in private 
housing schemes is partially subsidised (McCarty et al. 2014). The higher end of 
the low-income spectrum is predominantly assisted to access home ownership 
either using state-provided insurance to lenders against default, resulting in 
lowered interest rates, or through housing tax credits where private developers are 
incentivised to develop affordable housing by getting access to tax credits, 
resulting in lowered unit costs (ibid.).  
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From the above it is clear that the role of the private sector in delivering housing 
on a global scale has changed considerably over the last few decades. Worldwide 
there is a larger dependence on the private sector to act as provider. In South 
Africa, though, the state is still the predominant provider of housing to low-
income households and the uptake of enabling demand-side subsidies has been 
slow (Nene 2015).    
 
2.2.2 The private sector in SA 
 
According to Gardner (2003) there are three main sources of housing finance 
available in South Africa that, when combined, can offer some form of housing 
affordability. These are:  
a. Subsidies – state provided capital contributions towards some form of 
housing 
b. Credit – typically provided by some form of accredited financial 
provider 
c. Own contributions – required to access most housing forms, typically 
accumulated through savings. 
As stated earlier, the South African residential market can be broken up into four 
segments by property value: the subsidy market, gap market, affordable market 
and traditional market (see Section 2.3 for definitions of these markets). These 
markets are typically accessed using either one or a combination of the above-
mentioned finance options.  
The former market includes both households living in subsidised state-provided 
houses (typically RDP or BNG) and households living in informal settlements. In 
the RDP/BNG market the state acts as property developer, identifying land and 
beneficiaries and providing funding, while the private sector is typically tasked 
with providing professional services and acting as contractors (Tomlinson 2007; 
Huchzermeyer & Karam 2016). 
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In the informal sector, in contrast, the private sector tends to act as developers and 
contractors, although often in individual capacity and often informally (Lemanski 
2009; Landman & Napier 2009; Mtanto 2016). In 2011 roughly 2.1 million (15%) 
households lived in informality (Statistics SA 2011). Of this, roughly 710 000 
households (35% of all households living in informality and 5% of all households) 
were backyard dwellers in informal settlements (ibid.; Eighty20 2015). These 
backyard dwellings are typically constructed by small-scale (informal) 
contractors, the owners themselves, or bought as pre-made units in township 
markets (Lemanski 2009; Shapurjee, Le Roux & Coetzee 2014; Mtanto 2016).  
The traditional (mortgaged) market is entirely developed, financed and 
constructed by the private sector (FFC 2012). This sector includes only the top 12-
15% (depending on what income levels is used for the lower cut-off) of 
households, by income (FFC 2012; CAHF 2016; Eighty20 2015). According to 
the National Credit Regulator (2017) 94% of mortgages awarded (and 97% by 
value) in 2016 went towards individuals earning more than R15 000.  
 
Table 1 shows the total floor area of residential buildings completed by the formal 
private sector between 2012 and 2015. Although total delivery has remained 
relatively stable, overall there was a significant increase in large house (>80m2) 
delivery and a decrease in small house (<80m2) delivery.  
 
Table 1: Formal private sector delivery: Number of m2  
Buildings completed 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Affordable housing <80m2 902 955 808 514 764 268 791 987 
Dwelling houses >80m2 2 805 442 2 859 082 2 776 600 3 158 391 
Flats & townhouses 1 104 767 1 218 234 1 166 426 1 174 581 
Other residential 45 645 88 659 88 528 73 155 
Total 4 858 809 4 974 489 4 795 822 5 198 114 
(Source: adapted from Master Builders South Africa 2016) 
 
The total floor area of state-provided housing that was delivered in 2015 can be 
roughly estimated in order to compare with the private sector delivery. Through 
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the BNG subsidy scheme the state was able to deliver 95 210 units in the 
2014/2015 financial year (Department of Human Settlements 2015). Assuming a 
house area of 40m2 (Mguli 2013), this equates to roughly 3.8 million m2 of 
housing delivered by the state. This value excludes social housing and other state 
provided delivery, which is minimal in comparison (Department of Human 
Settlements 2015). Therefore, of the roughly 9 million m2 of residential housing 
built in 2014/2015, about 42% was provided by the state. 
Figure 4 shows the number of dwellings built per year by the private sector. It is 
clear that the 2008 credit recession had a strong negative effect on the number of 
houses built by the private sector in the years following the recession. 
Interestingly, the affordable and gap markets showed more growth following the 
2008 credit recession than the traditional market (CAHF 2015a). 
 
Figure 4: Formal private dwellings built per year 
(Source:  Absa 2017, quoting Statistics SA) 
 
In summary, the private sector, as developer, has played an important role in 
providing housing in the informal low-income market and the formal traditional 
market. In the formal subsidised market, the state has predominantly played the 
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role of developer. In the gap market, the private sector is getting more involved as 
developers. The gap market is explained in more detail in Section 2.3. 
The government has in recent years acknowledged the role that the private sector 
can play in housing delivery. Lindiwe Sisulu, Human Settlements Minister, said in 
2014: “We have to make it attractive for them [the private sector] to come on 
board. I have an appointment to see the [finance] minister. Incentives exist in 
various other forms for the private sector for various reasons. I think this one is 
very necessary” (Cokayne 2014). 
 
2.2.3 Mortgages in SA 
 
Section 2.2.2 briefly mentioned the various types of housing finance typically 
available in SA. This sub-section will discuss the availability of credit, and more 
specifically, mortgage finance, in South Africa. Microfinance is available and 
used in SA to enhance access to housing (Gardner 2008), but this will not be 
discussed in any further detail in this report.  
In SA, mortgage advances make up about 23% of credit extended by registered 
financial credit providers and 60% of the total household sector debt (South 
African Reserve Bank 2017). The so-called ‘Big Four’ banks, together with SA 
Homeloans, provide the bulk of mortages in SA (Mahlaka 2016; Kelder 2006).  
Banks in SA have, in the past, been reluctant to grant home loans to lower income 
earners (Pillay & Naude 2006; Tomlinson 2007). However, a number of mortgage 
products have been developed aimed at the lower end of the market in recent 
years. A summary of affordable housing products on offer by traditional mortgage 
providers in SA is shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Summary of affordable housing mortgage products on offer 
Loan Provider Absa SA Homeloans Standard Bank FNB 
Product name MyHome Loan 
Affordable 
Housing 
Package 
Affordable 
Housing Loan 
Home Loan 
Repayment 
period 
Up to 30 years Up to 20 years Up to 20 years Up to 20 years 
Loan portion Up to 100% Up to 100% Up to 100% Up to 100% 
Income Up to R22000 
R8000 and 
above 
Up to R18600 R3500 – R25000 
 
An alternative finance product was introduced by Old Mutual through a 
subsidiary called Housing Investment Partners (HiP) (Property24 2013). Although 
its products are not marketed specifically to be used in conjunction with the 
FLISP subsidy, the HiP’s product is aimed at the sub-R500 000 residential 
market. The product is different in the sense that it takes into account an 
applicant’s potential future income and adjusts loan repayments as income grows 
over time. The loan amount to be repaid is fixed as a percentage of income (HiP 
Housing n.d.). A possible drawback to this product can be that loan repayments 
can only be done via payroll deductions or debit orders.  
Table 3 shows the number of mortgages granted in SA and their values by income 
category for 2015-2017. The data for 2017 is estimated from the quarter one 
results. The number of mortgages granted and the value of the mortgages are 
skewed towards the higher income earners, as can be expected. Roughly 93% of 
all mortgages granted and 97% of the value of the mortgages granted were for 
households with incomes of more than R15 000. Furthermore, there is a steady 
decrease in the number of mortgages granted in the R10 000-R15 000 income 
bracket between 2015 and 2017. Consequently, it can be concluded that, even 
though banks do offer mortgage products to lower income earners, relatively few 
are granted in reality.  
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Table 3: Size and number of mortgages granted in SA by income 
 Number of mortgages Rand value of mortgages (R million) 
Income 
category 
2015 2016 2017* 2015 2016 2017* 
R0-R3 500 20 8 28 R8.2 R2.3 R167.12** 
R3501-R5 
500 
104 74 52 R16.7 R14.1 R23.1 
R5 501-R7 
500 
544 502 464 R161 R180.8 R233.8 
R7 501-R10 
000 
1 678 1 125 752 R448 R310.3 R219 
R10 001-
R15 000 
9 790 7 186 4 912 R3 321.3 R2 480.5 R1 753 
>R15 000 152 295 144 806 137 868 R143 104 R139 917 R134 667 
Total 164 431 153 701 144 076 R147 059 R142 905 R137 064 
*Estimation only. Values calculated by quadrupling the first quarter results 
**possible mistake in results 
(Source: NCR 2016; NCR 2017) 
 
As stated earlier, the gap market can be defined by house price varying between 
R180 000 and R500 000 (see Section 2.3). As seen in Table 4, the number of 
mortgages in the gap market range has been decreasing since 2015.  
 
Table 4: Number of mortgages granted by size 
Size of mortgage granted 2015 2016 2017* 
R0-R50K 2 932 1 839 1 728 
R51-R100K 6 199 5 558 5 760 
R101-R150K 5 226 4 542 4 240  
R151-R350K 22 508 18 958 17 440 
R351-R700K 54 102 50 041 44 744 
>R700K 73 465 72 764 70 164 
Total 164 432 153 702 144 076 
*Estimation only. Numbers calculated by quadrupling the first quarter results 
(Source: NCR 2016; NCR 2017) 
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According to Eighty20 (2015) the most common reason given by banks for 
declining mortgage applications was an unacceptable credit record. A lack of 
affordability was only the second most common reason. In 2012, applicants 
earning between R10 000 and R15 000, had a 19% and 25% chance of getting a 
mortgage application approved at FNB and ABSA, respectively (Eighty20 2015). 
 
2.3 Gap housing 
 
This section provides an overview of the gap market in South Africa. The gap 
market is defined in the first sub-section. This is followed by a brief history of the 
formation of the gap market and an introduction to the FLISP subsidy. Next, 
FLISP subsidy delivery is discussed and lastly, reasons for the limited 
implementation of the FLISP subsidy are discussed.  
It is worth noting that the terms gap market and FLISP are often used 
interchangeably. However, the gap market is a market defined by house values 
and income bands, while FLISP refers to the subsidy introduced to address the 
limitations of this market.  
 
2.3.1 The gap market defined 
 
The gap market can loosely refer to households earning too much to qualify for a 
fully subsidised state provided house, and too poor to access housing unassisted 
on the formal market. Various definitions are used by organizations to quantify 
the market. Some organizations, such as The Banking Association South Africa 
(2016), state that household income is the primary criteria used to determine 
whether a lending activity is aimed at gap housing. Both the National Housing 
Finance Corporation (2017) and The Banking Association South Africa (2016) 
align the gap market with the FLISP subsidy household income range of R3 501-
R15 000. The FLISP subsidy is explained in more detail in Section 2.3.3.  
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The CAHF (2016) on the other hand, prefers to define the market by housing cost. 
According to the CAHF (ibid.), the South African housing market can be divided 
into the following four segments according to property value: 
a. The subsidy market – properties worth R300 000 or less 
b. The gap market – properties worth between R300 000 and R600 000 
c. The affordable market – properties worth between R600 000 and R1.2 
million 
d. The traditional (conventional) market – properties worth more than 
R1.2 million 
It is important to note that the incomes and house costs presented above are not 
correlated, not in 2017 rand terms at least. As is shown in Section 2.3.2, an 
income of R3 501 can only afford a house of R90 500, while an income of 
R15 000 can buy a house of R385 000, without access to the FLISP subsidy. 
Including FLISP, these values increase to R178 000 and R405 000, respectively. 
This is well short of the R600 000 gap market upper limit referred to by the 
CAHF (2016). This discrepancy can be partly explained by the fact that the upper 
limit of the FLISP subsidy has remained unchanged since 2012. If the R15 000 
upper limit is adjusted to 2017 Rands using the consumer price index (CPI) over 
the stated period (as per Statistics SA 2017b), the upper limit would be closer to 
R18 500, able to afford a house of R485 000. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, 
the least costly new house that can be bought in Johannesburg costs about 
R400 000 in 2017. Therefore, the CAHF’s (2016) upper house price limit of 
R600 000 is, perhaps, too high. In 2012 Rust (2012) referred to the sub-R500 000 
market as the gap market. Even given inflationary changes, this value is more 
realistic. 
The lower house cost limit of R300 000, proposed by the CAHF (2016) is high as 
well. The value of a non-credit-linked housing subsidy (or BNG subsidy) is 
currently R160 573 (Western Cape Government 2015). As stated above, the lower 
end of the gap income level of R3 501 can afford a house of roughly R178 000, if 
the FLISP subsidy is used. Therefore, a lower house value of R180 000 is 
realistic. 
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It should be noted that in 2017, households earning R15 000 can only just afford 
the least expensive new entry level house the market has to offer, assuming a 
good credit record and a contribution of 28% of income towards housing. Since 
many households will not be able to achieve this, is it is proposed that the upper 
income limit of the gap market should be taken as R18 000. This would allow 
households who can access a reasonable interest rate (prime +1%) to afford a 
house of R480 000. A household earning the same amount, but who can spend 
less on housing (arguably 25% of income) and gets a worse interest rate (prime 
+2%) will only be able to buy a house of R402 000. For the remainder of this 
report, the gap market will be defined by household incomes of R3 501 to 
R18 000, who are able to afford houses of between R180 000 and R500 000. 
The Construction Industry Development Board (2017) states that the increase in 
construction costs roughly follows inflation. Therefore, it can be expected that gap 
house costs will increase by roughly the same amount. Therefore, the FLISP 
upper income limit will have to be adjusted upwards within the next year or two, 
to compensate for the expected increase in house prices. 
Figure 5 shows the various market segments graphically. It also indicates the size 
and income range of each market segment, grouped by income. About 25% of 
households fall into the gap market segment (FFC 2012; CAHF 2015c; Eighty20 
2015). Those who fall into the gap market include key public sector workers and 
entry-level workers in the private sector (FFC 2012). The market includes the 
Note: It is generally accepted that a household should spend no more than 30% of its gross 
income on housing (Hulchanski 1995; Wallace 1995; Stone 2006). To calculate mortgage 
affordability, the CAHF (2016) uses an instalment/income ratio of 25% for their calculations. 
Furthermore, Statistics SA (2011) estimates that households earning between R10 000 and 
R24 999 spend only 21% of their income on housing. Therefore, the income ratio that 
households should comfortably spend on affordable housing varies widely. For the purposes of 
this report an instalment/income ratio of 28% is used. It should be noted that this ratio impacts 
the total mortgage a household qualifies for severely.  
According to the CAHF (2015c), banks typically charge an interest rate of prime plus about 2% 
in the affordable housing market. However, one developer who was interviewed as part of the 
research for this report stated that the interest rates given to their clients range between prime 
+1 and prime +1.5%. For the purposes of this report, an interest rate of prime +1.25% (11.5%) 
was used for all affordability calculations. Furthermore, a payback period of 20 years, no 
savings contributions (as a deposit) and a good credit history was assumed. 
Where prices have been adjusted for inflation, Consumer Price Index (CPI) values for past 
years were used, as per Statistics SA (2017b).  
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bulk of the lower-middle class and typical job descriptions for main breadwinners 
include mine and quarry workers, general clerks, motor vehicle artisans, nurses, 
teachers, secretaries and police officers (CAHF 2009). 
 
Figure 5: The South African housing market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: adapted from FFC 2012; CAHF 2016; Eighty20 2015) 
 
The Banking Association of South Africa (2016) states that the affordable market 
had an upper income limit of roughly R20 000 in 2015. This value has been 
adjusted for inflation in Figure 5.  
The lower income limit of the gap market is R3 501. As long as the upper income 
limit of the full capital subsidy, offered by the state, remains at R3500, the ‘state’ 
section shown in Figure 5 will shrink while the ‘gap’ section will grow as income 
increases over time. The FFC (2012) states that the gap market is growing 
predominantly due to affordability constraints. Both levels of unemployment and 
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levels of debt are high, making it difficult for households to save and access 
mortgages. 
 
2.3.2 Formation of the gap market in SA 
 
Under apartheid law, non-white South Africans had been unable to legally buy 
land in urban areas until the late 1980’s, when this legislation was abolished 
(Tomlinson 1997). In 1987 banks started selectively providing mortgages loans to 
the previously excluded, predominantly low-income black market. This opening 
of the market coincided with a severe deterioration of the South African economy 
and interest rates rising from 13% in 1987 to 20% in 1989. These factors made 
repayment of mortgage loans difficult for many first-time homebuyers (ibid.).  
Furthermore, bond boycotts, used as a political ‘weapon’ of the anti-apartheid 
struggle, made it difficult for banks to repossess properties where households 
were regularly defaulting on their bond-repayments (Tomlinson 1997). These 
bond boycotts were labelled by banks as a ‘political risk’. These factors all 
contributed to the banks having a perception of this market as posing a 
commercial risk. Subsequently, most lenders exited the market in the early 1990’s 
(ibid.). 
In 1992, prior to the advent of democracy, the National Housing Forum (NHF) 
was established, consisting of multiple parties and various industry stakeholders, 
aimed at formulating a non-racial housing policy (Cirolia 2016). The result was a 
negotiated process where much time was spent deciding which housing type to 
deliver (‘four room’ or ‘progressive’) and which delivery mechanism to 
implement. Ways of attracting financial institutions back into the predominantly 
black, low-income market that they fled from in the early 1990’s, formed an 
important part of the discussion as well (Tomlinson 2007). 
The housing policy that resulted, documented in the Housing White Paper of 
1994, was characterised by a framework where the private sector would act as 
housing provider. All households earning less than R3 500 per month would be 
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entitled to a subsidy from the state, enough for a 30 m2 ‘starter house’ on a 200 m2 
serviced site. There was an expectation that this subsidy, combined with a 
mortgage loan from a formal mortgage provider, would be sufficient to deliver a 
‘four room’ house (Tomlinson 2007). 
Cirolia (2016) states that, in order to attract mortgage financers to the subsidised 
market, a Record of Understanding (ROU), was signed between the Department 
of Housing (DoH) and the former Association of Mortgage Lenders (AML). 
Subsequently, to lessen the perceived political risk for lenders, the Mortgage 
Indemnity Fund (MIF) was established in 1995, to assist lenders in repossessing 
properties where defaulting on repayments have occurred (ibid.). 
Between 1995 and 1998, only about half of the 140 000 loans falling under this 
agreement were given to subsidy holders (Tomlinson 2007). Disagreements 
between the state and banks over how the MIF guarantee was supposed to be 
implemented led to the dismantling of the MIF in 1998 (ibid.). The state was 
unhappy with the number of loans given to subsidy holders, with the banks stating 
that most subsidy holders were either unemployed or informally employed, 
making it difficult for them to afford a monthly mortgage repayment. This led to a 
second withdrawal of formal mortgage financers from the low-income market 
(ibid.).  
In subsequent years, various other forms of housing finance started to become 
popular in SA. Both banks and non-bank finance providers had started focussing 
more on micro-loans aimed at housing purposes (Rust 2002). These loan amounts 
were typically small and aimed at incremental improvements and they were often 
secured with pension or provident fund benefits, as opposed to the house itself. 
However, while mortgage finance is typically provided at prime +2, the micro-
loans were often given at prime +40, possibly putting large financial strains on 
recipients in the events of economic change (ibid.).  
In order to manage and assist the non-mortgage lending market, the National 
Housing Finance Corporation (NHFC) was set up by government in 1996 (NHFC 
2017). By 2003 the NHFC had provided housing finance to 209 000 households. 
However, rates of delivery had started to decrease and the organizations’ appetite 
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for risk was often questioned, seeing that one of its aims was to facilitate 
financing a perceived high-risk market segment (Tomlinson 2007).   
While the state was trying to improve access to micro-finance provided by both 
bank and non-bank organizations, it was simultaneously pressuring banks to go 
down-market with their mortgage products. Tomlinson (2007), states that this 
effectively resulted in formal banks and smaller non-bank lenders competing in 
the same market; much to the harm of the latter.  
Until the early 2000’s, relations between the large banks and the government had 
been strained, with the state accusing banks of discriminatory practices 
(Tomlinson 2007). In 2004 the Financial Sector Charter (FSC) was introduced 
(Financial Sector Charter Council n.d.). During its inception, the Charter aimed to 
compel banks to disclose their mortgage lending figures, amongst others 
(Tomlinson 2007). The intent was to use another piece of proposed legislation, 
called the Community Reinvestment Bill, to force banks to meet certain lending 
targets for households earning between R1500 and R7500 (ibid.). However, there 
was resistance from the banks and in the end it was agreed that banks would 
voluntarily set its own lending targets (ibid.; Venter 2009). 
According to Venter (2009) the initial voluntary target was set at a total lending 
book of R42 billion (to households earning between R1500 and R7500) in the first 
5 years after the implementation of the FSC. By the end of 2008 the lending book 
was R52.2 billion, exceeding the target by 30%. Tomlinson (2007), however, 
highlights that a large portion of the households who were supposed to benefit 
from the FSC, simply could not. In 2007 the cheapest house on the market was 
R120 000, affordable only to those earning between R5000 and R7000. Porteous 
& Naicker (2003, cited in Cirolia 2016) states that those earning R4000 or less, 
were effectively excluded, making the credit gap smaller.  
Therefore, there was an unserviceable ‘gap’ in the market, leaving households 
earning between R3500 and R5000 unable to access a full housing subsidy or a 
formal bond. Furthermore, it brings into question the results posted by banks. The 
mortgages included in the R52.2 billion lending book clearly were not reaching 
the lower end of the market. Also, results were reported by house size and not by 
29 
 
house cost, making it more difficult to assess how successful the FSC intervention 
was. 
The introduction of the FSC came just as the Department of Housing (DoH) was 
introducing its revised housing policy, the so-called ‘Breaking New Ground’ 
policy, in 2004 (DoH 2004). This new strategy was clearly aimed at attracting 
more private sector involvement into the housing sector.  
 
2.3.3 The FLISP subsidy 
 
In 2005 the Department of Housing introduced the Finance-Linked Individual 
Subsidy Program (FLISP), aimed at closing the so-called ‘gap’ in the market. The 
‘gap’ refers to the affordability gap experienced by households that earn too much 
to qualify for a fully-subsidised housing unit and too little to successfully access 
mortgage finance from a formal financial institution (NHFC 2017). The FLISP 
subsidy is a once of amount paid directly to a mortgage provider to lessen the 
deposit obligations when applying for a mortgage from a formal finance provider 
(FFC 2013).  
Initially, the FLISP subsidy was administered through accredited lenders. The 
subsidy was hardly implemented in the first few years following its introduction, 
mainly due to budgetary constraints and a lack of knowledge by housing officials 
(Cirolia 2016). To facilitate implementation of this subsidy, a centralized 
administration approach was adopted in 2011 and the NHFC was tasked with 
administering subsidies together with the various provincial housing departments 
(ibid.). 
With its introduction in 2005, the subsidy was aimed at households earning 
between R3500 and R7000. After poor adoption of the policy, the amounts were 
revised in 2012 to include households earning up to R15 000. Furthermore, the 
subsidy could now be used for a serviced site, or buying or constructing a new 
home (Cirolia 2016). The initial subsidy was limited to buying new houses 
costing R300 000 or less, but this cost limit was removed in 2015 due to the 
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limited number of houses being supplied for less than that amount (Gauteng 
Province Human Settlements 2015). Furthermore, the subsidy was extended to the 
resale market in 2013 (Rust 2013). In its yearly Estimates of Provincial Revenue 
and Expenditure report the Gauteng Provincial Government (2017) states that the 
FLISP subsidy qualifying income was adjusted to R18 000 per month in 2017, 
able to afford a house of roughly R470 000. However, no other proof of this 
adjustment could be found.  
The subsidy works on a sliding scale  model, with households earning R3500 able 
to access a maximum amount of R87 000 and those earning R15 000 able to 
access R20 000 (NHFC 2017). The FLISP subsidy is available for both sectional 
and freehold title purchases (ibid.).  
Table 5 and  
Figure 6 shows the total mortgage amount that can be afforded for various 
incomes in the gap range, with and without a FLISP subsidy. The FLISP amount 
decreases by R1 175 as income increases by R200 (Western Cape Government 
2016). Calculations were based on the assumption described in the Note box on 
page 24 (Interest rate: 11.5%; 20 year payback period; 0% savings contribution).  
As mentioned in in Section 2.3.1, new gap houses in Johannesburg start at roughly 
R400 000. Therefore, one needs to earn about R14 300 to afford a new house at 
2017 rates. However, McGaffin & Kirova (2016) states that purchasing power can 
vary widely across the cap income range, although demand can be seen as 
homogenous across the band.  
 
Table 5: Affordability of mortgage for various income ranges 
Income range FLISP subsidy 
amount 
Mortgage amount 
(excl. FLISP) 
Mortgage amount 
(incl. FLISP) 
R3 501-R3 600 R87 000 R92 000 R179 000 
R7 001-R7 100 R66 400 R184 000 R250 400 
R10 001-R10 100 R48 800 R263 000 R311 800 
R12 501-R12 600 R34 100 R328 000 R362 100 
R14 901-R15 000 R20 000 R391 000 R411 000 
(Source: own calculations) 
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Figure 6: Affordability of mortgage for the gap income range 
(Source: own calculations) 
Figure 7 shows how the amount of income needed to afford a R400 000 house can 
vary. In this case interest rate, contribution from savings and mortgage 
contribution as ratio of income is varied. The ratio of income that can be spent on 
housing has the most detrimental impact on affordability.  
 
Figure 7: Household income required to purchase R400 000 house 
(Source: own calculations) 
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2.3.4 FLISP housing delivery  
 
This section aims to discuss the past delivery of FLISP subsidies. Reliable data for 
subsidies delivered prior to 2013 could not be obtained. Data sources for later 
years vary widely, but the data from the Department from Human Settlements are 
presented in Table 6. Delivery data for Johannesburg specifically could not be 
obtained, but the data for Gauteng province is included. 
 
Table 6: Targeted and actual national and provincial (Gauteng) FLISP housing subsidy 
delivery since 2012 
Year 
Subsidies delivered 
Source South Africa Gauteng 
Target Actual Target Actual 
2012/13 - - - - n/a 
2013/14 - 1 696 - 247 (DoHS 2014; GPHS 2014) 
2014/15 1 101 1 193 50** 696 (National Treasury 2016; DoHS 
2015; GPHS 2015) 
2015/16 12 929 2 253 1 293 818 (DoHS 2016; GPHS 2016) 
2016/17 17 231 2 660 - - (DoHS 2017) 
**possible error in target setting 
 
There is a clear increase in delivery for both Gauteng and South Africa, but targets 
are not being met. One possible reason might be that there is simply not enough 
new housing stock in the gap price range being provided, which would limit the 
amount of subsidies that can be delivered. In Gauteng, FLISP subsidy has been 
more successful than in South Africa in general, if measured against the target set. 
Another reason might be that people cannot get mortgages approved due to poor 
credit ratings, which would once again limit a FLISP subsidy from being 
delivered (DoHS 2016). This can be disputed though, since households in the gap 
market income range have lower portions of indebtedness than their peers in the 
higher income groups, as can be seen in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Proportion of indebtedness per income group in Gauteng 
(Source: adapted from Joseph & Culwick 2016) 
 
The Gauteng Provincial Government (2017) estimates that the following amount 
of FLISP subsidies will be delivered in the next three years: 893 in 2016/17 year, 
1340 in 2017/18 year and 1378 in 2018/19 year. Human Settlements Minister 
Lindiwe Sisulu announced a new Human Settlements Development Bank to be 
launched in May 2017 (SA Property Insider 2017). Just before the launch of the 
bank, Sisulu said: “The strategic focus of the bank will be to facilitate the 
increased provision of finance across the human settlements value chain” (ibid.). 
One of the main functions of the bank would be to facilitate and scale up the 
delivery of FLISP subsidies (ibid.). However, the bank will only start to function 
once the Human Settlements Development Bill is passed, which was expected to 
happen in September 2017. By the time this report was concluded, no evidence 
could be found that the bank had started functioning. FLISP subsidy delivery in 
both Gauteng and South Africa as a whole has failed to meet the targets set over 
the last few years. Despite this, Gauteng Province has set ambitious targets for the 
coming few years. The bank launched by Minister Sisulu might just be what is 
required to increase FLISP subsidy delivery. The next section discusses some 
reasons for why FLISP housing subsidy delivery has been so slow. 
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2.3.5 Reasons for limited FLISP subsidies being awarded 
 
FLISP subsidy delivery has failed year on year to meet the targets set. There are 
numerous reasons for this failure, most of which can be classified in three 
categories (FFC 2012; Khathi 2013; Venter 2015): 
a. Shortage of supply by the private sector 
b. Difficulty in accessing finance 
c. Administrative issues on the DoHS/NHFC side 
 
Shortage of supply 
 
According to Venter (2015) the private sector is delivering too few houses in the 
gap market cost range, especially in the sub-R400 000 price range. In 2015 
developers stated that they were unable to provide a 45m2 house on a 125m2 site 
for less than R400 000 (ibid.). Today the least expensive 40m2 new house in 
Johannesburg costs R400 000. There are numerous reasons for this. Firstly, long 
implementation times tend to drive up the total costs of projects. The FFC (2012) 
states that gap housing projects take on average three years to implement (Figure 
9). Of these three years, about half is for the township establishment and approval 
process. This includes the time required for processing tenders, rezoning and 
issuing of development rights. The time required for the transfer and handover 
process also tends to be highly variable, leading to uncertainty and higher costs 
(ibid.). 
 
Figure 9: The housing value chain 
Source: (adapted from FFC 2012) 
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Furthermore, the costs for internal reticulation (of water, electricity and other 
services inside the project boundaries) are typically seen as unfunded mandates, 
requiring the developer to cover these costs (FFC 2012). In mixed developments, 
where subsidised units are mixed with bonded units, the cost of internal 
reticulation needs to be subsidised using bonded units. This drives up the cost of 
the bonded units, making it less affordable and within range of fewer households 
(ibid.). Figure 10 shows a cost breakdown of a typical gap house. The bulk 
infrastructure is the most costly item, making up almost a quarter of the total cost. 
In total, around 33% of the total house cost lies in the serviced site (Rwida 2011).  
 
Figure 10: Value chain for gap housing 
(Source: adapted from Rwida 2011) 
(Note: In the source document, the Author (Rwida) refers to affordable housing. But the 
market described is the gap market.) 
 
According to the Construction Industry Development Board (2017), the cost of 
construction has, for the past few years, risen at roughly the overall CPI inflation 
rate. Therefore, houses are getting more expensive to build year on year and if the 
FLISP subsidy limit is not increased at the top end, even those earning R15 000 
will soon be unable to afford new houses.  
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Developers are also cautious to enter the gap market. According to the CAHF 
(2009) developers and lenders are wary of offering housing units that are of a 
similar value to fully subsidised units, fearing the risks created when potential 
buyers realise that others are getting similar houses for free. In 2009, the average 
subsidised house cost R135 000 to construct. Households with an income of 
R5000 could only afford a loan of R128 000, meaning households earning R3500-
R5000 could not afford a house that others were getting for free. This means a 
financed house needs to be built to a higher spec in order to be commercially 
viable. This effectively prices the first level of the market out of the affordability 
range of the target market.  
Bertraud (2010) states that academics in the housing demand field either look at 
the wrong data or interpret data incorrectly when estimating housing demand. The 
formal housing supply system forms a continuum between the formal and the 
informal sector and the boundaries between the two are set by regulations and 
transactional costs between the two. This is one of the main reasons why gap 
housing is so scarce and so important. Therefore, stricter regulations push the cost 
of any formal developments up, irrespective of the target market. 
A noteworthy side effect of insufficient supply of new gap housing stock is that it 
puts inflationary pressure on the existing housing stock. This further undermines 
household affordability (FFC 2012).  
 
Difficulty in accessing finance 
 
Finance can be difficult to come by for households in the gap market income 
range (Venter 2015). In 2010, 50% of households earning between R3 500 and 
R7 000 (what was then defined as the gap market income range) had formal 
credit, while only 3.4% had a mortgage (FFC 2012). Figure 8 shows that lower 
income groups has lower levels of indebtedness than their higher income 
counterparts, but this can partly be ascribed to their inability to access mortgage 
finance.  
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Access to formal credit for the poor has increased dramatically over the last 
decade. However, in the absence of mortgage finance, access to credit does one of 
two things. Firstly, it puts inflationary pressure on the existing housing stock, 
which further undermines household affordability. Secondly, it leads consumers 
to spend their money elsewhere, such as on consumer products (FFC 2012).  
Khathi (2013) states that poor levels of savings also contribute to difficulties in 
accessing housing finance for applicants. Access to mortgage finance in discussed 
in more detail in Section 2.2.3. 
 
Administrative issues on the DoHS/NHFC side 
 
This section discusses two main administrative issues: a poor understanding of 
housing demand and limited administrative capacity at the Provincial and 
Municipal level. According to the FFC (2012) there is a poor understanding of the 
housing demand in South Africa. There is insufficient data on how backlogs are 
estimated and what the actual effective demand is. The state uses a number of 
ways to calculate demand and in the absence of a uniform estimation approach; 
resources will continue to be ineffectively allocated (ibid.).  
Real housing demand should be a function of population growth, household 
formation, household size, rate of urbanization and life stage, amongst others 
(FFC 2012). Life stage is an especially important factor to consider. A proper 
understanding of housing demand is crucial for the entire housing spectrum, not 
just gap housing (ibid.). 
There are a number of concerns with regards to the administration of FLISP 
subsidies. Firstly, while policy is fairly flexible in that it allows provincial and 
local government to adapt policy according to local context, there is a perception 
from industry stakeholders that national government dictates a “one size fits all” 
approach (FFC 2012).  
Secondly, there is backlog with accreditation of municipalities, that keeps 
municipalities from implementing the full spectrum of subsidies and project types 
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that are available to them. This severely hinders the municipalities’ abilities to 
implement projects with a variety of housing types (FFC 2012) 
Lastly, new properties are not being registered at high enough rates to combat the 
registration backlog. By 2010, only 50% of houses delivered by the state were 
registered on the Deeds registry, while the rate of new registrations has decreased 
every year since 2005 (FFC 2012). The result is that people are effectively denied 
entry into the housing market.  
 
2.4 Housing in Johannesburg 
 
As stated in Section 1.6, Johannesburg is closely interlinked with its neighbouring 
metropolitan municipalities. However, for the sake of simplicity and to keep the 
scope of this report within reasonable bounds, this section will focus only on the 
City of Johannesburg. 
As can be seen in Figure 11, the housing market in Johannesburg is segregated 
economically. Circle sizes indicates the number of residential properties per ward 
council. The northern part of the city contains mainly expensive properties, with 
only a few exceptions of lower cost housing in Alexandra, Diepsloot and 
Tembisa. The south-western parts of the City and the city centre contains mainly 
more affordable properties. The remainder of this section will focus on estimating 
the size of the gap market in Johannesburg, as well as how the market has 
performed in recent years. 
Establishing the size of the gap market in Johannesburg is difficult and no source 
could be found that gives a specific value. However, an attempt will be made to 
get a rough estimate based on available data. Data is mainly derived from 
Eigthy20 (2015) estimations, based on 2011 surveys by Statistics SA. Values have 
been adjusted to 2017 Rands. Upper income limits reported works out to roughly 
R14 300 in 2017, as opposed to R15 000 used to define the gap market, so it 
should be noted that these values are rough estimates at best. 
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Figure 11: House prices in the City of Johannesburg 
 
 
  
 Under R300 000  R600 – R1 200 000 
 R300 000 – R600 000  Over R1 200 000 
(Source: adapted from CAHF 2017, showing data for 2011-2016) 
 
Eighty20 (2015) estimates that roughly 25% of households (3.1 million) 
countrywide earn between R3 500 and R15 000.  Of this 3.1 million households, 
roughly 980 000 (32%) are located in Gauteng. The 2011 Census indicated that 
37% of Gauteng households reside in Johannesburg (Statistics SA 2017a). 
Assuming a uniform income distribution across Gauteng, we can estimate that 
Johannesburg has roughly 363 000 households in the gap market. The number of 
households in Gauteng increased by 6% between 2011 and 2017 (Statistics SA 
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2011; Statistics SA 2017a), therefore, roughly 385 000 households in 
Johannesburg are in the gap market.  
According to Eighty20 (2015) about 34% of households in the gap market live in 
so-called ‘inadequate’ housing countrywide. Assuming a uniform distribution 
countrywide and that all households living in ‘inadequate’ housing strives towards 
so-called ‘formal’ housing, it can be calculated that Johannesburg has a gap 
housing shortage of around 130 000 units. 
The performance of the gap market will now be explained. Data is mainly 
available for the years leading up to 2012/2013 and some sources use R500 000 as 
the upper house value limit of the gap market, while others use R600 000. The 
CAHF (2016) states that house values have also increased significantly over the 
last few years and houses in the gap market has grown more than the rest of the 
residential market. Once again, the values quoted below should not be taken as 
exact, but rather as rough estimates. 
It was shown previously that roughly 25% of households are in the gap income 
range. Due to a lack of better information, it is assumed that Johannesburg has the 
same income distribution, meaning roughly 363 000 (385 000 in 2017) 
households are in the gap market in Johannesburg. Interestingly, the Affordable 
Land & Housing Data Centre (2012) states that 24% (172 000) of all registered 
residential properties in Johannesburg are valued between R250 000 and 
R500 000, falling in the gap market, while 8% (59 000) are valued at less than 
R250 000. This data is from 2010, so some more expensive properties would 
since have increased in value into the affordable market, while less expensive 
properties would have grown in value into the gap market. Furthermore, the value 
of 16% of registered properties is unknown. By 2012, about half of all 
government provided houses had not yet been registered on the Deeds Registry 
(City of Johannesburg Department of Housing 2013), therefore it is possible that 
the 59 000 properties valued at less than R250 000 is considerably higher in 
reality.  
The residential market in Johannesburg is active. Of all properties sold in South 
Africa, around 20% of these are situated in Johannesburg (accounting for 17% of 
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total sales value). Around 34% of all residential properties sold in the City 
Johannesburg has a value of less than R500 000 (AL+HDC 2012). 
Property churn (the rate at which a property is sold) in Johannesburg is lower than 
average for properties costing less than R500 000 (AL+HDC 2012). This probably 
indicates either limited supply of housing stock in this price category or limited 
access to finance.  
 
2.5 Conceptual framework 
 
The proposed research will aim at researching the role played by the private sector 
in delivering gap housing in Johannesburg. It will focus on the role of private 
property developers. The conceptual framework diagram (Figure 12) aims at 
showing the relationship between the private sector and government in delivering 
gap housing in Johannesburg. It includes some of the obstacles faced by the 
private sector in entering the market.  
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Figure 12: Conceptual framework diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The private sector 
 Mainly involved with middle to 
high income housing 
developments 
Housing in Johannesburg 
 Large shortage of low-cost and 
gap-income housing units 
 Many informal settlements 
 Low-cost housing mainly on 
the periphery 
Gap housing 
 Beneficiaries earn too much for 
fully-subsidised units and too 
little for access to formal 
financing (bonds) 
 Government has introduced a 
FLISP subsidy to ‘close the 
gap’ 
 Few subsidies given – 
knowledge limited 
Obstacles 
 Low profit margin 
 Price of well-located land 
 Costs of services 
 Material costs 
 Codes and standards 
 Risk 
 Inadequate infrastructure 
(bulk/link) 
 Access to financing 
Increased access to 
housing opportunities 
Government 
 Main provider of low-cost 
housing 
 Too little capacity to close the 
housing backlog 
43 
 
2.6 Summary 
 
This section has provided an international overview of the housing market. South 
Africa is not the only country with a gap in its residential market. Many 
developing countries and even some developed countries encounter similar 
market failures, although at a smaller scale.  
The private sector in SA is highly involved at the higher end of the residential 
property market, while the state is the predominant supplier of formal housing at 
the lower end of the market. However, with the introduction of the FLISP subsidy, 
the private sector has been incentivised to develop in the gap market. 
Unfortunately, the costs of developing houses has escalated so much that only the 
highest earners in the gap market can access new housing.  
The gap market in Johannesburg is very large in terms of income. However, there 
is a clear shortage of houses in the R180 000 to R500 000 price range. The uptake 
of FLISP subsidies have also been limited and at current rates of delivery it is 
unlikely that the gap housing shortage in Johannesburg will be addressed. The 
next chapter discusses the research method used for this study.  
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3. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to describe the research method used for the study undertaken. 
Property developers operating in the gap market in Johannesburg were 
approached and interviewed, with the aim of using their feedback to answer the 
research questions stated in Chapter 1. 
The study proposed is descriptive, exploratory and analytical in nature. According 
to Creswell (2009) a qualitative research method is suited for this type of study. 
The qualitative research method allows for a flexible approach and for questions 
to be asked that invoke rich and exploratory answers (Mack et al. 2005). 
Qualitative research is a subjective scientific methodology used to describe the 
reality of a situation (Mack et al. 2005). It aims to understand and describe a 
scenario in a particular context and can be used to produce cross-contextual 
generalities (Mason 2002). This methodology is characterised by its reliance on 
the researcher to gather information (Creswell 2009). 
According to Creswell (2009), qualitative research is a form of interpretive 
inquiry, where researchers interpret what they see and hear. The researchers’ 
interpretations and conclusions cannot be separated from their own histories, 
backgrounds and cultures. This can be seen a weakness in the methodology, but 
can also give a multi-angled, nuanced view of the subject under investigation. 
The qualitative research method is used to learn what meaning participants hold 
about the issue under study, not what meaning the researcher holds or what the 
available literature says about the subject. (Creswell 2009). Interaction with the 
participants is encouraged to ensure they have a chance to shape the themes that 
emerge as the process unfolds issue. Furthermore, this methodology relies on 
multiple sources of data, such as interviews, documents and observations. This 
research will make use of the former two data types, with a particular focus on 
using interviews (ibid.).  
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The remainder of this chapter describes how the research population was chosen, 
how data was collected and how it was analysed. Ethical issues associated with 
the research design are discussed as well. 
The study under consideration is largely descriptive in nature as it seeks to 
describe the current involvement of the private sector in the gap market in 
Johannesburg. It also contains some explorative elements, which is particularly 
prevalent in the third research sub-question. 
As provided in Chapter 1, the research question:  
 What role does the private sector play in providing gap housing in 
Johannesburg? 
and sub-questions for the study are as follows: 
 What keeps the private sector from delivering more gap housing units in 
Johannesburg? 
 What are the challenges faced by the private sector in providing gap 
housing in Johannesburg? 
 How can corporate social investment (CSI) contributions, or any other 
interventions, be used by private companies to assist their employees to 
access gap housing? 
The above questions are what, why and how questions. The aim of these questions 
is to ultimately establish what role the private sector, and more specifically private 
property developers, play in providing gap housing in Johannesburg.  
To assist in answering these questions, data was gathered in two ways. Primary 
data was gathered by conducting interviews with private sector developers. The 
method by which these developers were identified is described in Section 3.2 and 
the interview structure is described in Section 3.3. Secondary data was gathered 
by looking at existing grey literature. This data was used to complement the 
primary data collected, where required.  
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3.2 Research population 
 
This section discusses the manner in which the research population was chosen. 
As stated in Section 3.1, data was gathered predominantly through interviews with 
property developers and complemented with grey literature. This section will 
focus on the population contacted for the former data type. 
Creswell (2009) emphasizes the importance of purposefully selecting participants 
that will best help the researcher answer the research questions. However, 
according to Saratankos (2005), sample representativeness is not consistent with 
the qualitative research paradigm, since little statistical analysis will be done. This 
does not mean that the manner in which samples are chosen is unimportant. 
Qualitative researchers should still be weary of using non-representative 
informants, overly relying on “elite” informants and of “generalising from 
unrepresentative events or activities” (ibid.: 97). To assist with answering the 
research questions, Creswell (2009) recommends using multiple sources and 
methods when conducting qualitative research and emphasizes.  
In light of the above, the decision was made to contact all developers operating in 
the gap market in Johannesburg to ensure that sufficient data was gathered for a 
meaningful analysis and to account for some non-responses. Allowance was also 
made to account for some developers being unwilling to participate.   
The scope of the study was limited to developers. Private financers and 
contractors were excluded from the study. Developers were identified using three 
methods. Firstly, an internet search was used. This was done by looking at Google 
results, combing through websites such as Property24.com and 
PrivateProperty.co.za and phoning real estate agents who sell houses in the gap 
market. Secondly, an organization that represents affordable residence property 
developers, the South African Affordable Residential Developers Association 
(SAARDA), was contacted and asked for a list of their members. Finally, some 
developers were willing to give me the details of other companies they have 
worked with and would perhaps be willing to assist me. The manner in which 
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these developers were contacted and data collected from them is discussed in 
Section 3.3. 
A total of 11 companies were approached to participate in the study. Some of the 
companies do only land development, others only top-structure developments and 
others do the full process, from identifying land to ultimately marketing and 
selling houses. Some of the companies I approached were relatively small and 
others were described to me as ‘the big players’. Of the 11 companies approached, 
two developers declined to participate, two were unresponsive and I interviewed 
seven in total. 
 
3.3 Collecting data 
 
As stated in Section 3.1, empirical data was collected mainly through semi-
structured interviews, but grey literature was also consulted to gather 
supplementary data. This section seeks to describe how data was collected using 
both of these strategies. 
 
3.3.1 Data collection using interviews 
 
After the research population was identified, efforts were made to contact persons 
in the organizations who are knowledgeable about gap housing developments. 
This was done by talking to secretaries, scanning LinkedIn profiles and asking 
other developers for names. Ultimately, I found that the right people to talk to 
were either the company directors, or people with titles such as ‘Project Manager’ 
or ‘Development Manager’. 
According to Simon (2006) it is important to know as much as possible about the 
people being interviewed. Studying LinkedIn profiles and company websites 
proved helpful to establish what companies and their employees do and what their 
backgrounds are.  
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After making contact with the relevant people, either by telephonic means or 
email, participants were sent a participant information sheet, explaining the nature 
of the study and what was expected of participants. Possible ethical issues, such as 
the use of participant names and confidential information are discussed in the 
document as well. The participant information sheet can be seen in Appendix A. 
Possible dates, times and locations of interviews were also discussed with 
participants. 
Before interviews commenced, I gave an introduction of myself, the project, the 
methodology to be used and how data would be handled. Furthermore, 
participants were given a consent form to fill in and sign (see Appendix B). This 
was to give permission for the interview to be done, inform the participant of how 
data would be stored and used and to ask for permission to record the interview.  
The questionnaires used in the interviews were set up in a semi-structured 
manner. Questions were designed to be open ended, set up to elicit the views and 
perceptions held by the interviewees. The questions were designed in such a 
manner that their answers could eventually be used to answer the research 
questions described in Section 1.4.  
The full questionnaire can be seen in Appendix C. The questions covered in the 
questionnaire touched on the following themes: 
1) Personal and company background 
2) Overview of the gap market 
3) Company participation in the market 
4) Perception of the market 
5) Barriers to entering or expanding in the market 
6) Interventions to help deliver more houses 
Simon (2006) mentions the importance of pilot testing questions to ensure that 
they are interpreted as intended. For this reason I tested my questions multiple 
times with people unfamiliar with the field of study. The majority of interview 
participants were Afrikaans speaking white males, like myself, and I was 
confident that there would be little misunderstandings due to language. However, 
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I did, after the first interview, change some terms in my questions to what are 
more generally used in the industry.  
Following permission from participants, interviews were recorded so as to 
facilitate dialogue that arose from answers given. Transcribing the interviews was 
done at a later stage, but as soon as possible after the end of interviews. The time, 
date and location of interviews were recorded at commencement. All interviews 
were done at the headquarters of the company being interviewed.  
Only four of the developers were available for face-to-face interviews. The 
questionnaire was sent to the remaining three developers via email. However, 
emailed responses tend to be shorter and less comprehensive due to the inability 
to ask follow-up questions based on previous answers given.  
All data collected was stored electronically in password protected files. Data was 
organised by type and theme to facilitate data analysis. The data analysis process 
is described in Section 3.4. Interviews were primarily conducted in Afrikaans, but 
the feedback is presented in English in this report. Being bi-lingual, I am 
confident that translations were done accurately. 
While doing interviews and organising collected data, I kept a notebook with both 
descriptive and reflective notes in a journal. This helped me to organise my 
thoughts and highlight things that stood out. This method is advised by Bogdan & 
Biklen, as cited in Creswell (2009).  
 
3.3.2 Data collection using documents 
 
In order to complement the primary data collected using interviews, secondary 
data was collected using grey literature. These documents include annual reports, 
policies, websites and magazines. This data was collected where interview 
participants, for example did not know how many gap housing projects the 
company had done in the past. For some companies, this information was readily 
available on their websites. This data collection method also served another 
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purpose. It helped me to familiarise myself with the industry and the terms 
typically used.  
 
3.4 Approach to analysis 
 
Data analysis is aimed at making sense of and understanding a given dataset. 
According to Creswell (2009) the process of data analysis involves preparing raw 
data for analysis, conducting different analyses, moving towards a deeper 
understanding of the data, representing data and interpreting it. 
More specifically, qualitative data analysis is a process that translates raw data 
into codes that can be organized by theme (Creswell 2009). This process uses 
inductive reasoning whereby themes emerge from data through the researchers’ 
examination of codes (ibid.; Huchzermeyer & Boshoff 2017). This approach was 
adopted while analysing data for this study.  
Figure 13 visually shows the qualitative data analysis process that was followed, 
based on the process described by Creswell (2009). To start off, collected data 
was transcribed, scanned and noted, and organized by data type. Next, data was 
read and reread and recordings were played and replayed, to give an impression of 
the tone, content and credibility of data.  
The data was then broken into fragments, called codes, either in sentence, phrase 
or picture form. These codes were studied for relevance and categorised by theme. 
Creswell (2009) suggests identifying four to five themes.  
Another step in the process was to use inductive reasoning to interpret and find 
meaning in the themes that were identified. Creswell (2009) states that, even 
though Figure 13 suggests a linear approach to data analysis, the process is more 
interactive and iterative. The various stages of the process should not necessarily 
be done in the order presented. 
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Figure 13: Data analysis in qualitative research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: adapted from Creswell 2009) 
 
Throughout this process, data was continually checked for both reliability and 
validity, by checking transcripts against recordings, whether questions were asked 
as intended and by checking answers against grey literature. Reliability has to do 
with the accuracy of data collected, whilst validity has more to do with clarifying 
biases, presenting negative results and checking if themes emerge from various 
sources of data. While looking for findings from the analysis, care was taken with 
regards to making generalisations about the meaning of the data (Mack et al.; 
Creswell 2009). 
 
3.5 Ethical considerations 
 
The questionnaire presented to property developers is aimed as extracting 
information about the involvement of private developers in delivering gap housing 
Interpreting the meaning of 
themes/description 
Interrelating themes/descriptions 
Themes Description 
Coding the data 
Reading through data 
Organizing and preparing data 
Raw data 
Validate 
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in Johannesburg. The information requested might expose certain competitive 
advantages of a developer or other sensitive information. Care was taken to 
inform developers to answer questions carefully and not expose information that 
they feel might be sensitive. Furthermore, all developers were informed that their 
feedback would be presented anonymously in the final report.  
To facilitate an easy, open dialogue with interview participants and ensure that all 
details were captured, discussions were recorded. Interviewees were informed at 
this at the start of the interview and they were given the freedom to stop the 
recording at any time.  
Before any interviews commenced, ethics clearance was obtained from the Ethics 
Committee. The ethics clearance letter is attached in Appendix D.  
 
3.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter, I discussed the research method, methodology, design and 
approach to analysis used in this research study. The ethical issues under 
consideration when taking on a study of this nature, were discussed as well.   
The study undertook was qualitative in nature and data was gathered using semi-
structured interviews with representatives from property developers active in the 
gap housing market in Johannesburg.  Complementary data was also collected 
from grey literature sources. 
Eleven developers were identified and invited to participate in the study. 
Ultimately, seven participated: four by face-to-face interviews and three using 
emailed questionnaires. An extensive body of knowledge was collected using 
interviews, and analysed to identify emerging themes. This helped me understand 
the role played by the private sector in providing gap housing in Johannesburg. 
The next chapter accurately describes the empirical data collected.  
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4. WHAT DEVELOPERS HAVE TO SAY: A 
PRESENTATION OF THE DATA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the data and results from the study undertaken. Feedback 
from all seven interviews are sorted by theme and presented below. Firstly, a short 
profile of each company is given. This is followed by a section that discusses 
various aspects of gap housing in Johannesburg. Next a section discussing issues 
that the private sector encounters while delivering gap housing is presented, 
followed by a short section on possible remedies that would facilitate more private 
sector involvement and increase the uptake of FLISP subsidies. The penultimate 
section discusses current and possible future interventions by which private sector 
companies can assist their own staff to access gap housing. A brief summary of 
the chapter is presented at the end.  
To complement the data obtained from interviews, some extra figures and data 
was obtained from company websites and annual reports, as well as other sources 
of grey literature. In some cases the references for this data is not provided, to 
protect the identities of the participating companies.  
 
4.2 Participant company profiles 
 
This section aims to describe the contexts and markets in which the participating 
companies operate. A brief profile of each participant company is provided. The 
market sectors these companies operate in, the amount of units they’ve delivered 
and their typical clients are discussed as well 
Table 7 gives a brief profile of each company. To protect the identity of the 
companies, the information provided is kept as vague as possible, while trying to 
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provide sufficient context for the reader. The title of the person interviewed, type 
of developments, type of developer and rough age of the companies are provided.   
 
Table 7: Summary of company profiles 
Company 
Title of person 
interviewed 
Type of developer Age of company 
Company 1 Project Marketer Land, top-structure >20 years 
Company 2 Director Land, top-structure >20 years 
Company 3 Lead Developer Land >10 years 
Company 4 General Manager Land, top-structure >20 years 
Company 5 Sales Manager Top-structure >10 years 
Company 6 Senior Project Manager Land, top-structure >10 years 
Company 7 Development Manager Land, top-structure >20 years 
 
There are some similarities and differences between the participants in the study. 
All of the participants are established companies started more than 10 years ago. 
Three companies were identified that are less than five years old, but they either 
declined to participate or were unresponsive.  
Of the companies interviewed, all started out developing either land, or top-
structures, or both in the lower end of the residential housing market. Three of the 
participants have since tried to move into higher end residential developments, 
two of them successfully. 
One of the companies is also involved with commercial and industrial 
developments, while three others have developed large housing projects that 
include some commercial properties as well. The rest focus only on residential 
property.  
The number of housing units delivered in the gap market varied widely between 
the companies. The lowest a company had delivered was 500 units over its 
lifetime, while the largest company had delivered in excess of 35 000 units in this 
market. Although, as is shown in section 4.3.1, the majority of developers define 
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the gap market using the FLISP income indicators, few of these units were bought 
using FLISP subsidies.  
The majority of the companies identified their typical clients in the gap market as 
whoever can afford it. One company stated that they develop in the areas where 
their typical cliental already live. Another company stated that their typical clients 
are wholly determined by the banks’ criteria for giving home loans.   
Only Company 7 stated that they do intensive market studies to identify their 
target market. This company only includes gap housing in their integrated housing 
developments and the market research is also aimed at establishing what portion 
of each housing type to include. 
 
4.3 Gap housing in Johannesburg 
 
This section discusses the feedback regarding the gap market in Johannesburg. It 
looks at the various definitions companies use to define the gap market, how 
companies perceive the gap market, the locations of their projects and their 
involvement with public-private partnerships (PPP’s). Lastly, it also discusses 
how their projects are funded, marketed and sold. 
 
4.3.1 The definition of the gap market 
 
Developers have different definitions of the gap market, although the majority are 
tied, in some way or another, to the FLISP subsidy income ranges. A number of 
developers described the gap market as households earning between R3 501 and 
R15 000. Others were more aware of the limitations of the FLISP subsidy and 
stated that in their eyes, the gap market includes only those earning between 
R12 000 and R15 000. They acknowledged that households earning R3 501 – 
R12 000 cannot get access to the new housing market. One developer saw the gap 
market in the R15 000-R18 000 income range. 
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Some developers also included house prices in their definitions, since there is a 
direct link between income and affordable house price. For one developer the 
maximum house price in the gap market is R600 000. Another developer referred 
to the bank sector house price of R750 000 as the top end of the gap market.  
A strong theme that emerged from the interviews is that the least costly new house 
the market can deliver is about R400 000 in Johannesburg. In general, this would 
be affordable only to those earning R14 300 and more, although numerous 
developers stated stat a minimum of R12 000 is required to enter the market. In 
more rural areas houses can be built for less, due to the lower cost of land, but 
people tend to earn less there as well. In Ekurhuleni and west of Johannesburg, in 
the West Rand District Municipality, house prices are slightly more affordable 
with new 40m2 units for sale for R380 000.  
Company 3 mentioned that the term ‘gap’ has, in the industry, become 
synonymous with the FLISP subsidy. The term is used to refer to any house where 
a FLISP subsidy might be used to supplement a mortgage. However, the FLISP 
subsidy covers only a portion of the gap in the market – between fully-subsidised 
and fully-bonded units. Other mechanisms, such as sectional title RES 3 
developments and rental developments can also be used to fill the gap between 
fully-subsidised and fully-bonded units.  
Some developers opposed the use of the term ‘low-cost housing’, stating that it 
makes their developments sound cheap. Instead, they proposed using ‘affordable 
housing’ as an umbrella term for fully-subsidised, partially subsidised and social 
housing. This definition is in contrast to the market definitions discussed in 
Section 2.3.1, as per the CAHF, and shows that there is disagreement in the 
industry with regards to the meaning of certain terminology.  
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4.3.2 The perception of the gap market in Johannesburg 
 
“If I build 30 houses today I’ll have them sold by next week” – Company 3 
 
The overall perception of developers of the gap market in Johannesburg is 
overwhelmingly positive. That said, there are numerous issues and bottlenecks in 
the processes that they feel can be improved upon, but these are discussed in 
Section 4.4. 
The gap market in Johannesburg is seen as very large. One developer claimed a 
shortage of 800 000 units in the gap market, but it might be that he was confused 
with the total housing shortage in Gauteng, as stated by the Gauteng Province 
Human Settlements (GPHS) in 2017. According to this developer, the whole 
industry delivers less than 15 000 gap housing units per year across the country.  
Another developer described it as the largest market in SA, both in terms of 
number of houses and number of people. Almost 50% of houses in Gauteng fall in 
the gap market price range. The market is also seen as one that’s growing, and the 
void between the fully subsidised and gap market is growing as well.  
One developer, responsible for the quote at the beginning of this section, was 
optimistic, but cautious, stating that the FLISP subsidy is not a sustainable 
intervention. He was not sure how much longer the state would be able to afford 
it.  
A general view shared was that it is impossible to develop and build a new house 
for less than R400 000 in Johannesburg. Therefore, the bottom end of the FLISP 
qualifiers, those earning between R3 500 and R12 000 (R14 300 according to this 
author’s calculations), cannot be serviced in the new house market.  
A number of developers found that their clients, typically first time buyers, were 
very excited to move into their houses. Soon after taking ownership, a number of 
alterations and additions are often made.  
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4.3.3 Location of projects 
 
The majority of gap housing developments done by the companies included in this 
study are located close to the edge of the City of Johannesburg municipal 
boundary. Figure 14 shows the locations of the projects relative to the municipal 
boundary. Three of the projects shown are within 20km of the city centre and only 
five within 20km of the Sandton CBD. The GPHS in 2017 announced a number 
of so-called mega cities that are planned for the future and contain large amounts 
of gap housing units, some as much as 3 500 units. The locations of these are 
shown as well. 
 
Figure 14: Location of gap housing projects of participating developers 
(Source: Map data copyrighted OpenStreetMap contributors; MDB 2013) 
 
The location of the projects loosely correlates to areas where applications were 
made for the establishment of townships, as shown in Figure 15. They tend to be 
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closer to the less developed edge of the city boundary. The majority of 
applications were made in the north, western and north-western belt of the city. 
The source of this map does not state the time when these applications were made. 
 
Figure 15: Township establishment applications in Johannesburg 
(Source: City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 2016) 
 
A number of reasons were given by developers for how the locations of their gap 
housing projects are determined. These included whether the land under 
consideration is serviced, what the cost would be to service the land, how 
accessible the land is, proximity to employment opportunities, proximity to social 
and religious amenities, being inside the urban edge and environmental 
constraints.  
The most important factor determining the location of a project, according to all 
respondents, was the price of land. It was clear from talking to the developers that 
it is almost impossible to develop a freehold residential unit within the boundaries 
of Johannesburg for less than R400 000. The cost of constructing an ‘entry-level’ 
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house and installing services is just about fixed. All developers who were willing 
to say how much they spend on these two factors reported roughly the same 
figures. The holding costs of the land while waiting to get a township approved by 
the city council depends on the time it takes for approval. However, the cost of 
land is a variable that can be controlled to a degree by the developer.  
Two of the developers stated that in Gauteng, the location of gap housing is of 
secondary importance, as long as it’s within the urban edge. The more important 
factor is the cost of land, and more specifically, serviced land. Both of these 
developers, however, were, at the time of interviewing, busy with mega-projects 
with over 10 000 units. These projects are so large that their sheer scale perhaps 
makes location less important.   
One experienced developer also highlighted the importance of environmental and 
geotechnical conditions of sites. Anecdotes were given of how they’ve had issues 
with dolomite and being too close to watercourses and wetlands which ultimately 
had a significant detrimental effect on the cost of their projects.  
Figure 16 shows the urban development boundary of the Gauteng province. The 
Johannesburg municipal boundary is wholly contained within the provincial urban 
boundary. All the projects identified in Figure 14 fall within this urban boundary. 
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Figure 16: Urban development boundary of Gauteng (Johannesburg in pink) 
(Source: adapted from Cilliers 2009) 
 
4.3.4 Involvement in public-private partnerships 
 
Of the seven developers interviewed, two are or have been involved with public-
private partnerships (PPP’s). PPP’s are agreements between public and private 
sector institutions where the private sector performs a function that is typically 
provided by the public sector and/or uses state property. Both of the companies 
involved with PPP’s are large companies capable of delivering in excess of 2000 
housing units per year. The sentiment from these companies was that PPP’s are an 
important tool for infrastructure development at a large scale.  Without these 
partnerships, mixed income developments containing fully-subsidised units are 
not possible. PPP’s can significantly reduce the risks of developing and can assist 
in accessing funding. However, both companies stated that this type of 
arrangement only works if there is a good working relationship between 
government and the private developer, as well as a long-term goal in mind.    
Three developers are not involved with PPP’s, the reason being that their projects 
are not large enough to justify this sort of arrangement. The remaining developers 
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shared negative sentiment towards the PPP concept. Company 2 stated that they 
do not like doing business with the government since they tend not to pay on time, 
while the business model of  Company 1 is built around managing the entire 
development value chain and being in control of as many of the processes and 
decisions as possible. 
 
4.3.5 Project funding 
 
Gap housing developments can be broken into two main stages that typically 
requires two different types of funding. The first development type, land 
development, involves acquiring, servicing and rezoning land and is dependent on 
what the industry calls development finance. The second development type, top-
structure development, involves the construction and sale of housing units. 
Developers tend to make use of different sources of finance for these two types of 
developments. 
A number of the companies interviewed stated that they receive top-structure 
funding from a variety of banks. Most of them reported having good relationships 
with some or all of the co-called ‘big four’ banks in SA, namely Absa, Standard 
Bank, Nedbank and First National Bank. Some companies require a house to be 
sold from plan before construction starts, and the client’s mortgage is then used to 
pay for the top-structure construction.  
The overall sentiment from companies was that accessing development finance is 
more complicated than top-structure finance and a wide range of funders are often 
used. When it comes to development finance, funders are more likely to work 
with developers with whom they have a longstanding relationship and who they 
know are experienced. Some of the funders that were named include Old Mutual’s 
Housing Investment Partners (HiP) Fund, the National Urban Reconstruction and 
Housing Agency (NURCHA), the National Housing Finance Corporation 
(NHFC), the ‘big four’ banks and the Department of Human Settlemenst (DoHS) 
in public-private partnerships (PPP’s). NURCHA is a development finance 
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company, funded by the government that provides development finance to 
contractors and developers who operate in the subsidised and affordable housing 
markets. 
One developer noted that the banks typically require presales of 10-20% of stands 
before development finance will be made available for a project. This is seen as a 
problem, due to the difficulty in selling lots before any servicing has taken place.  
Another developer stated that all the banks have different criteria for giving 
finance, which makes applying to more than one institution difficult and time-
consuming. This particular developer gets development funding from one bank 
and this bank only has about six land development clients in the affordable and 
gap market.  
The companies who make use of PPP’s reported various ways in which the 
government is involved in projects. Company 3 referred to a project where the 
City of Johannesburg gave land with the condition that a number of fully 
subsidised and credit-linked houses be developed. Company 6 stated how they 
received a subsidy to cover the costs for services for all their subsidised housing 
units.    
 
4.3.6 Project marketing and sales 
 
The sales and marketing strategies used by the six companies involved in top-
structure developments varies somewhat, although there are similarities in 
strategy between similar sized projects. Company 3, involved with only land 
developments, have good working relationships with a number of top-structure 
developers and does not market to a significant extent. 
On smaller projects, typically done by the smaller developers, there is an 
inclination to use external marketers and estate agents to sell top-structures. In 
some cases, a land developer would sell portions of land to different top-structure 
developers. Two of the smaller top-structure developers mentioned that they are 
64 
 
likely to make use of the marketing done by competing developers in the same 
area to sell their units.  
On larger developments, the strategy differs. Two developers makes significant 
use of their internal marketers and estate agents to sell their units. They would use 
billboards and pamphlets in the areas of their developments and even set up 
websites for their projects. One of these developers mentioned that the bulk of 
their employees work in the marketing department.  
In contrast to the above, one developer involved in a so-called ‘mega-city’ mixed 
residential development stated that after an initial round of marketing, they don’t 
need to market their units any further. As their project has gathered momentum, 
word of mouth marketing in the area has made people aware of the project. 
However, this might only be possible with projects of a certain size.  
 
4.4 Issues with the gap market 
 
Developers experience a number of issues in the market that they feel, if solved, 
will facilitate higher delivery and more affordable housing units in Johannesburg. 
This section describes the difficulties faced by gap housing developers in general, 
issues specific to up and coming developers and issues with accessing FLISP 
subsidies. 
  
4.4.1 Difficulties with gap housing development 
 
A number of problems with the market were reported that makes the industry 
difficult to work in, expand in or enter. Access to well-priced serviced land is a 
universal issue reported by the majority of developers. The price of the land itself 
can be excessive, but it is more often the time and cost of servicing land and 
establishing it as a township that escalates the end-user cost per house 
significantly.  
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The costs of bulk and link service contributions are excessive and there used to be 
confusion around how these costs were calculated by the CoJ, although this has 
been clarified to some extent. Costs of R60 000-R80 000 per house were reported 
for bulk and link service connections on recent projects in Johannesburg. 
The township establishment process can be time consuming. Company 2 reported 
that it had to, at times, wait up to a year to get a Section 82 certificate from CoJ. 
Section 82 refers to a certificate from the municipality that states that all 
conditions have been met regarding the establishment of the township and 
arrangements have been made for installation of services. Furthermore, it signifies 
that transfer of stands has been authorized and building plans have been accepted, 
In this particular case, the interest that had to be repaid on the loan for that time 
was R20 000 per stand, which ultimately had to be paid by the client. 
Developers have to compete with the subsidised market to an extent, especially in 
mixed-income developments where fully-subsidised BNG units are in close 
proximity to gap units. Both BNG and entry price gap units tend to be the same 
size (40m2). The finishes on the gap houses, however, are usually slightly more 
expensive. Some developers have found that there is a perception amongst some 
of their clients that they feel they shouldn’t be paying for something that others 
are getting for free.   
Property development is a capital intensive and risky business and the risks 
associated with a project must be priced into the financial model. Developers can 
manage and control, to a certain degree, the cost of land, professional services, 
construction and marketing; but there are uncertainties with regards to council 
processes that cannot be controlled. This makes it difficult for developers without 
significant cash reserves, and the end-user ultimately pays the cost of the risk.  
  
4.4.2 Barriers to entering the market 
 
Apart from the issues pointed out above, there are numerous others, raised by the 
established developers that keeps new developers from entering the market 
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successfully. The most daunting, perhaps, is the difficulty in accessing finance, 
especially development finance. The process of applying for a finance from a 
bank, is complex and banks tend to be risk averse, as can be expected. One 
developer stated that the bank they typically use has about six developers they 
fund and are happy with the size of their share of the market.  
Property development is capital intensive and new, small entrants do not have the 
capital to see them through the risks posed, especially by council taking long to 
approve applications. Holding costs of land while waiting for council approval 
can waste valuable capital funds. Company 2 quoted an emerging developer as 
saying that “the process simply beats us down.”  
Writing in the SA Affordable Housing Magazine, Harry Gey van Pittius (2017), 
South African Affordable Housing Developers Association (SAARDA) 
committee member, stated that affordable housing developments are becoming 
more capital intensive. In recent years, bulk and link service contributions have 
started to make up a larger portion of the overall development cost. In the past, 
local authorities used to take out loans to cover the costs of bulk infrastructure 
installations, which the residents then repaid as part of their rates over a period. 
However, bulk infrastructure was not seen as a high priority and these loans were 
often used for other purposes.  
With the introduction of the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 
(SPLUMA) in 2013, the handling of funds for bulk services changed. According 
to the Act, bulk contributions now have to be calculated on the date of 
proclamation of a township and needs to be payed when submitting a Section 82 
certificate. The contributions are not regulated by government, with the result that 
metros and councils can determine their own bulk service contributions. The extra 
and sometimes unpredictable contribution costs can add risk to developers, and 
especially emerging developers (Gey van Pittius 2017). 
Five of the developers interviewed stated that scale plays an important role in the 
financial viability of gap housing developments. Larger developers can negotiate 
better prices from suppliers and contractors, and can afford lower profit margins. 
They are more equipped to utilise the benefits of economies of scale. Large, 
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established developers can also create their own projects, while smaller top-
structure developers, for example, are more dependent on the availability and 
affordability of serviced land. However, developers do have different opinions of 
what a large development is and the term is clearly relative. For some developers, 
a 1000 property development is seen as large, but for others, especially in light of 
the planned Mega Projects in Gauteng (GPHS 2017), a 10 000 unit development 
is seen as large.  
In contrary to the above, one developer downplayed the importance of scale, 
especially with mixed income developments. The ratio between subsidised, FLISP 
and bonded housing becomes more important, especially if units are cross-
subsidised internally. Managing the cost of bulk and link service contributions is 
more important than scale, since these costs tend to make or break projects.  
 
4.4.3 Accessing the FLISP subsidy 
 
Developers have varying opinions on the use and accessibility of the FLISP 
subsidy. Some developers are frustrated with the NHFC and the DoHS, 
complaining that the time to process applications is excessively long and the 
process tedious. One developer noted a few instances where their clients were so 
disgruntled that they had to, in the end, use alternative sources of finance to pay 
for their houses. Companies 3 and 6 noted a recent improvement in the process, 
but others stated that things have remained largely unchanged. 
Not all developers had a negative perception of the subsidy process, though. Two 
of the larger developers interviewed reported a positive relationship with the 
NHFC and quick turnaround times for applications. There is, however, a 
perception, as noted in Section 4.3.2, that the FLISP subsidy scheme is not 
sustainable and some developers are uncertain of how much longer it would be 
available.  
The biggest shortcoming of the FLISP subsidy is that it serves a too narrow band 
of people. In practice, only those earning between R12 000 and R15 000 can 
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access the subsidy, while households earning R3 501-R12 000 are effectively 
excluded. The value of R12 000 reported by developers seems to include a 10% 
saving contributions towards the house price, according to this author’s 
calculations. If no savings contribution is made, the value should be closer to 
R14 300.  
 
4.5 Possible interventions to increase gap housing delivery in 
Johannesburg 
 
Numerous suggestions were made by developers to enhance the delivery of gap 
housing by the private sector. These ranged from improvements to the FLISP 
subsidy, to administration reform within the city council, to alterations to the 
manner in which banks grant loans to gap housing applicants.  
Increasing the income qualification range for the FLISP subsidy was seen by 
some developers as a possible positive intervention that would allow more 
households to access the subsidy. Earlier in this report it was mentioned that the 
upper income limit of the subsidy might be changed to R18 000 in the near future. 
Some developers welcomed this possibility, while others stated that an increase in 
the subsidy amount given should rather be investigated. For example, instead of 
households earning R3501 being eligible for a R87 000 FLISP subsidy, this value 
should be increased, which would benefit lower income household more. The 
FLISP application process should be streamlined as well to speed up access to 
funds. 
As stated in Section 4.4.1, a significant portion of the end-user cost of a new gap 
house lies in the cost of the services. A bulk services subsidy would enable 
developers to lower house prices by the value of the subsidy given – leading to a 
direct saving to the client. A quicker township approval process and lower bulk 
and link services costs would also lead directly to lower selling prices.  
Gey van Pittius (2017) suggests that bulk service contributions should be divided 
into three classes. The bulk service contributions for fully-subsidised (i.e. 
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RDP/BNG) housing should be fully subsidised, and partially subsidised for 
affordable or gap housing. Only traditionally financed housing should then be 
charged the normal bulk service contribution rate.  
Another suggestion made was to encourage banks to lower the interest rates they 
charge their gap housing clients, while simultaneously limiting short term credit 
providers to give out loans too easily. This would enable a wider range of clients 
to qualify for mortgages and consequently, FLISP subsidies.  
One developer noted that people are ill-informed about good credit behaviour. 
Many of their clients are unaware that late payments of retail accounts, for 
example, negatively affect their ability to access mortgage finance. A nation-wide 
educational campaign could help foster good credit behaviour.  
A suggestion was also made to overhaul the whole subsidy policy. The upper 
income limit of the BNG subsidy should be increased so that the bottom end of 
the current gap market can access housing more easily. Furthermore, the use of 
FLISP subsidies for RES 3 type developments should be encouraged, since the 
subsidy is available for sectional title purchases as well. According to one 
developer, these units should cost less due to a lower land and servicing cost and 
thus enable lower income earners to access new housing. However, this would not 
necessarily be the case, since higher structures cost more and the saving on land 
might be offset by the increased cost of the housing structure.  
 
4.6 The role of private companies in helping their employees in 
accessing gap housing 
 
Developers have a wide range of experiences with regards to the role that other 
private companies are currently playing in assisting their employees in acquiring 
gap housing. A number of developers referred to initiatives launched by some of 
the large gold and platinum mining companies in providing housing assistance to 
their employees, but most of these fall outside of the geographic boundaries of 
this study and will not be covered in further detail. 
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Three of the companies interviewed have been approached by private companies 
where interest was shown in buying a number of houses for their employees. 
Company 2 reported that it had sold 20 houses to another company where the 
employer had paid for the deposits on the units. 
Company 7 referred to a construction company that had assisted their employees 
to buy gap houses using both the FLISP subsidy and the HiP mortgage product 
offered by Old Mutual (and briefly discussed in Section 2.2.3). The developer 
could, however, not say to what extent the company provided help to their 
employees.  
One developer knew of a large engineering firm who was investigating how to 
assist their employees to access gap housing by informing them of the FLISP 
subsidy, educating them on how credit works and using their Corporate Social 
Investment (CSI) to contribute with deposits. Once again, the extent to which this 
was done could not be established.   
The general sentiment from developers was that private companies, with the 
exception, perhaps, of mining companies, helping their employees with housing is 
not a regular occurrence. The above-mentioned examples are more exceptions 
than rules.   
 
4.7 Summary 
 
This chapter aimed to give a structured overview of the feedback gathered from 
having semi-structured interviews with a range of private sector developers 
operating in the gap market in Johannesburg. The chapter started by presenting a 
brief profile of each participating company. The companies who participated in 
this study vary in size and the type of developments they are involved with. 
The following section presented a detailed discussion of various aspects relating 
to gap housing in Johannesburg, from the perspectives of developers. These 
aspects includes their definitions of the gap market, their perceptions of the 
market, the locations of their projects,  their involvement in PPP’s and how their 
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projects are funded. Developers had various definitions for the gap market, but 
overall, in their minds, the gap market and FLISP market is roughly the same 
market. For the most part, developers had a positive perception of the market in 
terms of size on future growth, although they mentioned a number of issues that 
make developing more difficult. The three largest issues identified was the high 
cost of bulk service contributions, process delays and access to funding. 
A section discussing how the state can assist developers in delivering more gap 
housing in Johannesburg was also included. Feedback differed widely from 
developer to developer and every developer had a different suggestions as to what 
subsidy intervention would benefit them and their clients the most.  
The last section in the chapter discussed the way in which private sector 
companies are currently, and can in future, assist their employees in accessing gap 
housing. With the exception of large mining companies, developers had few 
examples of private companies assisting their employees with accessing gap 
housing. The next chapter presents an analysis of the results.
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5. THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR: AN ANALYSIS 
OF RESULTS 
  
5.1 Introduction 
 
 A literature study was presented in Chapter 2 to contextualize the problem under 
investigation. Chapter 3 presented a research methodology and the results of the 
study were discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter seeks to analyse the results of the 
research and literature to answer the research questions discussed in Section 1.4.  
The chapter consists of five more sections. The first four sections are dedicated to 
answering the main and sub research questions, while the final section presents a 
short summary. 
 
5.2 The role of the private sector 
 
This section aims to answer the main research question. This is done by 
discussing how private developers see the gap market and what products they 
offer. An estimation of the size of the gap market in Johannesburg is also 
attempted. Lastly, an analysis is presented that seeks to clarify the optimism 
shown by developers towards the gap market.  
 
5.2.1 How developers see the market and what they offer 
 
For the most part, developers tend to define the gap market strictly according to 
the FLISP income ranges of R3 501–R15 000. However, one developer proposed 
using an upper income limit of R18 000 to define the gap market, since 
calculations show that currently, only households earning R14 300 and above can 
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afford a R400 000 house, assuming a contribution of 28% of income to covering a 
mortgage and reasonable interest rate. If a worse interest rate is obtained, or the 
ratio spent on mortgage is lowered only slightly, a household needs to earn 
considerably more to afford the same mortgage (see Figure 7, p.31).  
It should be noted that the upper income limit of the FLISP subsidy has remained 
at R15 000 since 2012. However, construction costs (and consequently new build 
house prices) have since gone up (CIDB 2017) and the portion of the gap market 
who can afford to buy a new house using a FLISP subsidy has effectively 
decreased year on year. Adjusting for inflation, as per Statistics SA (2017b), the 
upper income limit of the subsidy should be roughly R18 500 in 2017. However, 
it is not certain how the R15 000 upper income limit was calculated in the first 
place. This author recommends an upper limit of R18 000 for defining the gap 
market. This would allow households who can access a reasonable interest rate 
(prime +1%) to afford a house of R470 000. However, this calculation is highly 
sensitive to the portion of income spent on housing and interest rate used. A 
household earning R18 000, but who can spend less on housing (arguably 25% of 
income) and gets a worse interest rate (prime +2%) will only be able to buy a 
house of R402 000.  
 
What developers offer 
For the most part, developers in Johannesburg use the FLISP income indicators to 
define the gap market, although some also used an upper income of R18 000. 
However, developers are only able to sell new houses in Johannesburg for about 
R400 000. A few instances were found south of Ekurhuleni and in the West Rand 
District Municipality of houses selling for R380 000. Figure 17 shows entry-level 
freehold title houses available in Johannesburg in 2017.  
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Figure 17: New gap houses available in Johannesburg (freehold title) 
  
40m2 house in Savanna City – R400 000 40m2 house in Stretford – R 408 000 
(Property24 2017a) (Property24 2017b) 
 
Developers are acutely aware that they can only provide the highest earners in the 
gap market with new freehold houses. Numerous developers stated that only those 
earning above R12 000 can effectively access housing. However, calculations 
show that this figure should be closer to R14 300 (Section 2.3.1). There are, of 
course, other options for those in the lower end of the gap market to access 
housing. These options include sectional title houses (such as townhouses and 
apartments), the second hand market and rental options. Developers in 
Johannesburg have started to develop sectional title apartment units, although 
none could be found that are significantly less expensive than similarly sized 
freehold units. Figure 18 shows a development in Fleurhof, in the west of 
Johannesburg, where 40m2 apartment units are available for R365 000, affordable 
to households earning R12 700 (assuming an interest rate of 11.5% over 20 
years). Another development that sells 22m2 apartments for R250 000 is currently 
under construction in Soweto. These units would be affordable to households 
earning R7 000, although they only have one bedroom.  
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Figure 18: Sectional title development in Fleurhof 40m2 – R365 000 
(Source: Property24 2017c) 
 
 The second hand market 
Although this report is primarily concerned with discussing new houses in the gap 
market, the importance of the second hand market should be noted as well. The 
second hand RDP (or fully-subsidised market) is especially worth mentioning. A 
quick search on PrivateProperty.co.za and Property24.co.za reveals that there are 
two bedroom houses for sale in the R180 000 – R220 000 price range (R3 600 – 
R5 600 income) in the second hand market, predominantly in the south and south-
west of Johannesburg. These units are older than 8 years, since RDP units cannot 
be sold within the first eight years of taking ownership (Republic of South Africa 
1997). Roughly 24% of all houses on the deeds registry are RDP, or fully-
subsidised, units (CAHF 2015c). However, only half of units that have been 
delivered were registered by 2011, and should all of them be registered, the RDP 
share of the deeds registry would increase to 38% (ibid.). Although the second 
hand entry level housing stock is clearly high, these units tend to be resold at a 
low rate. Data from 2010 indicates that the churn rate of houses with values of 
less than R250 000 was 0.9% nationally and 0.56% in Johannesburg, roughly 4 
times lower than houses with values of more than R500 000 (AL+HDC 2012). 
From an affordability point of view, these second hand RDP units can be a 
possibility for households in the lower end of the gap market, although supply is 
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probably limited and access to traditional mortgage finance might be difficult to 
obtain. 
The second hand RDP market can be beneficial to those households selling their 
RDP units with the intention of moving up the housing ladder. Households selling 
their houses for R180 000 and looking to buy a R400 000 will need to earn only 
R5 600 to qualify for the R220 000 shortfall required. A significant portion of the 
gap market can potentially make use of this mechanism. The sale of RDP units at 
prices below the new build market would add valuable stock to the market that 
would be more within reach of the gap market that cannot afford new units 
(CAHF 2015c).  
 
 A summary of the market 
The gap market is dynamic and complex to define accurately. Different 
organizations have different opinions of what constitutes the gap market. Figure 
19 attempts to illustrate how this author sees the gap market. In terms of income, 
the gap market (b) income band stretches from R3 500 – R18 000. The gap market 
contains a relatively small serviceable (f) band, roughly R14 300 – R18 000, that 
can theoretically afford new houses on the market. The unserviceable band (e) 
cannot afford new houses on the market. They can, however, theoretically afford 
to buy in the second hand market and rent in the social housing market. The 
FLISP market (d) forms part of the gap market, although the majority of the 
market falls outside of the serviceable income band.  
It should be noted that all calculations about housing affordability is based on 
contribution of 28% of income to housing. In practice, a considerable portion of 
the market have a housing affordability lower than their income suggests due to 
high levels of indebtedness (CAHF 2015c).  
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Figure 19: The lower end of the housing market unpacked 
 
(a) Fully subsidised 
market 
(b) Gap market (c) Affordable market 
(d) FLISP market (e) Unserviceable gap 
market 
(f) Serviceable gap 
market 
 
 
5.2.2 The size of the gap market – making sense of the numbers 
 
From Section 5.2.1 it is clear that the gap market is fragmented and that various 
housing solutions are needed to provide for the different income bands. The size 
of the gap market in Johannesburg will now be analysed in further detail. The 
number of households in the gap market in Johannesburg was estimated as 
385 000 in Section 2.4, while roughly 130 000 of these households live in 
‘inadequate housing’. As stated earlier, private developers can only deliver houses 
at the bottom range affordable to households earning R14 300 and more. 
Therefore, although there is a shortage of 130 000 houses, only a round 11% 
(Eighty20 2015) or 14 300 of those households can afford to buy a house brand 
new. This estimation, of course, assumes that households living in inadequate 
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dwellings have the same income distribution as the remainder of the gap housing 
market. 
In 2016, about 31 000 mortgages were approved with values of less than 
R350 000 (Table 4, p.21). The NCR (2017) indicates that 43% of all credit is 
given in Gauteng. Taking into account that 37% of Gauteng households are based 
in Johannesburg and assuming a uniform credit distribution, it can be estimated 
that roughly 5000 mortgages below R350 000 were granted in Johannesburg in 
2016. In 2009, about 40% of bond registrations in SA were for new properties 
(AL+HDC 2010). Assuming the same proportion in 2016, roughly 2000 new 
bonds were registered for values less than R350 000. It is assumed that the bulk of 
these bonds were used for housing in the gap range. One developer stated that the 
whole industry countrywide delivers about 15 000 units per year. Johannesburg 
has 10% of the countries’ households (Statistics SA 2017a), therefore roughly 
1 500 units can be expected to have been delivered in Johannesburg; slightly more 
if you consider Johannesburg’s higher than average income distribution (Statistics 
SA 2012).  
Only 818 FLISP subsidies were awarded in Gauteng in 2016 and given the poor 
uptake that has been reported by developers, 2000 new gap houses delivered in 
Johannesburg is, perhaps, not unreasonable. What is clear from the above is that 
the gap market in Johannesburg is sizeable. Furthermore, although developers 
should be applauded for the scale at which they have been delivering gap houses, 
they are still falling short of the demand. 
Some developers overestimated the size of the gap market in Gauteng. As stated 
in Chapter 4, one developer claimed a total gap housing shortage of 800 000 units 
in Gauteng, while another claimed that 50% of Gauteng’s housing market lies in 
the gap market. Based on the method followed above and information from 
Eighty20 (2015) these values should be closer to 350 0000 and 25%, respectively. 
This section has tried to put the gap market in Johannesburg into perspective. 
When asked about the size of the market, five developers were hesitant to provide 
numbers. Most only stated that the market is very large. The two that did give 
numbers for the market size where, perhaps, overoptimistic. From the above it is 
79 
 
clear that developers are correct in that the market is very large and that there is 
significant potential for growth on the supply side.   
 
5.2.3 Optimism abound – the developers’ perspective 
 
As reported in Chapter 4, developers generally had an optimistic perception of the 
gap market. The previous section looked at the size of the market. This section 
aims to resolve why developers have such an optimistic view of the market by 
looking at past trends and future outlooks. 
Historical data indicates that, prior to 2013, the affordable and gap residential 
markets in Gauteng’s metros were growing faster than the overall market 
(AL+HDC 2012; CAHF 2015a). As shown in Figure 20 and Figure 21 the below-
R600 000 market (covering the entire gap market) grew the most in terms of 
numbers and value on a national level. The difference in growth between the 
lower end of the market and the upper end of the market in both graphs can partly 
be blamed on the credit recession of 2009 (CAHF 2015a).  
More recent data could not be found, but it expected that these trends might have 
died down a bit. From Table 4 (p. 21) it can be seen that the number of mortgages 
awarded countrywide in the 0-R350 000 and R350 000-R700 000 ranges reduced 
slightly year on year as a portion of the total number of mortgages given, between 
2015 and 2017. This might be caused by a housing market recovering from the 
2008 credit recession.  
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Figure 20: Growth in number of residential properties (2009-2013) 
(Source: CAHF 2015a) 
 
Considerable future growth is expected, especially in terms of number of new 
units. According to the 2017 Budget Speech, sufficient budget has been allowed 
to ensure the delivery of 66 554 FLISP subsidies countrywide by 2019, roughly 
33 000 for the 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 financial years, respectively (National 
Treasury 2017). As shown in Table 6 (p. 32), roughly a third of FLISP subsidies 
granted in 2015/16 were in Gauteng – leading to an expectation of roughly 11 000 
units 2018/18 and 2018/19 as well. As stated in Section 5.2.2, 37% of Gauteng 
households reside in Johannesburg, so the delivery figure can be further adapted 
to 4070 units expected per year in Johannesburg for the next two years.  
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Figure 21: Growth in value of residential properties (2009-2013) 
(Source: CAHF 2015a) 
Furthermore, the Gauteng Department of Human Settlements released a report in 
2017 that outlines a number of mega projects planned in Gauteng in the next few 
years. Five are planned within the municipal boundaries of Johannesburg and the 
two projects with data available will have in excess of 3 500 FLISP units each.  
From the above is clear why developers have such an optimistic view of gap 
market. Although some developers were sceptical about the sustainability of the 
FLISP subsidy, but judging by the number of subsidies budgeted for the next two 
years, developers have little to be concerned about, at least in the short term. 
 
5.3 Challenges faced by the private sector 
 
This section aims to answer the first and second sub-questions, as discussed in 
Section 1.4. Both questions are intrinsically linked and are concerned with 
difficulties developers face while doing gap housing developments. Sub-sections 
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are included that discuss the cost of bulk services, the cost of land, access to 
development finance and access to mortgage finance. A brief sub-section 
discussing issues faced specifically by emerging developers is included as well. 
Lastly a brief breakdown of possible interventions that might be beneficial to both 
developers and clients, is discussed.  
 
5.3.1 The cost of bulk service contributions 
 
The majority of developers who formed part of this study mentioned the cost of 
serviced land as one of the main contributors to the high cost of gap houses. 
Rwida (2011) stated that roughly 33% of the cost of a gap house goes towards the 
cost of serviced land. Of the 33%, 4% is for the cost of land, 23% for the cost of 
bulk services and the remaining 6% for internal services. Clearly, the cost of bulk 
services is the single largest contributor to the total cost of serviced land.  
Developers stated that bulk service contributions have escalated significantly in 
recent years. Harry Gey van Pitius (2017), chairman of the South African 
Affordable Residential Developers Association (SAARDA), even wrote an article 
in the SA Affordable Housing magazine titled ‘RIP affordable developers’, 
outlining how the rising cost of bulk service contributions is making it more 
difficult for developers to operate in the affordable market. In this instance the 
term ‘affordable’ is inclusive of the gap market.  
Once source states that the cost of electricity connection contributions costs in 
some municipalities had escalated by 4500% in the 10 years leading up to 2015 
(Infrastructure Dialogue 2015). Countrywide, other contribution costs, such as 
water, sewerage and roads, did not increase significantly, but there was a 
disproportionately high increase in contribution costs in 2014 (ibid.). Therefore, it 
is highly likely that Rwida’s 2011 estimate has grown to more than 33% in recent 
years.  
Developers stated that there is uncertainty about how bulk service contributions 
are calculated, although one developer was of the opinion that the calculation 
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method had been clarified by the City of Johannesburg to some extent in recent 
years. According to Graham & Berrisford (2015), development contributions are a 
contentious topic for municipal engineers and they are inconsistently applied.  
In the past, local authorities used to obtain loans to install bulk services. These 
loans were then repaid using a portion of the monthly rates, paid by residents 
(Gey van Pittius 2017). However, things have changed in recent years. According 
to the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act (SPLUMA), introduced in 
2013, bulk service contributions must be calculated on the date of proclamation of 
a township and is payable on the date of submission of Section 82 (Gey van 
Pittius 2017). However, the costs of contributions are not regulated and there is 
uncertainty as to how these costs should be calculated (South African Property 
Owners Association 2015). Studies undertaken by SAPOA (n.d.; 2013) to 
establish the cost of developing residential stands in different municipalities 
shows a difference of up to 50% in the cost of service contributions. Gey van 
Pittius (2017) states that not only is the uncertainty with regards to how 
contributions are calculated a significant problem for developers, but the 
escalating costs of contributions as well.  
As shown in Figure 3 (p. 9), the CoJ is located close to two other large 
metropolitan municipalities. Some of the developers who participated in this study 
have projects in more than one of these municipalities. According to the Dykes 
van Heerden Group (2017), each municipality has its own by-laws with regards to 
township establishment and bulk service contributions are not calculated in the 
same manner (ibid.). Administratively speaking one would assume that the 
processes are different between the various municipalities. None of the developers 
mentioned anything about costs and processes differing between the various 
municipalities, but it might be worth investigating further. 
Developers mentioned very little about the cost of constructing houses. This might 
be due to the fact that the cost of construction is always increasing and in the 
years 2005-2015, the increase has been at rates close to inflation or CPI (CIDB 
2017). So it might be that developers saw the increasing cost of construction as 
obvious and not needing to be mentioned. When asked about using alternative 
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methods and materials, a few developers stated that it does not work in SA, 
mainly because of labour issues. 
  
5.3.2 The importance of location and cost of land 
 
The location of some gap housing developments were discussed in Section 4.3.3. 
The majority of developments were shown to be close to the edge of the 
municipal boundary, with only a handful being relatively close to the 
Johannesburg and Sandton CBD’s, where the majority of economic activity in 
Johannesburg is concentrated.  
Attempts were made to compile a map showing land prices in Johannesburg. 
However, the data gathered was of poor quality and the map would not have 
added much value to this report. However, data about the cost of houses could be 
obtained as a second best alternative. Figure 22 shows both gap housing 
developments in Johannesburg, as well as house prices in Johannesburg. Larger 
circles indicate a higher density. As can be seen in Figure 22, gap housing 
developments in the west and south-west of the City are in so-called affordable 
areas (< R600 000). In contrast, the developments along the north-west of the City 
boundary are in more expensive areas. However, these developments are all 
mixed-use developments including fully-subsidised and fully-bonded units where 
the bonded units are typically used to internally cross-subsidise the rest of the 
development. The Gauteng Province Human Settlements (GPHS) in 2017 
announced a number of so-called mega cities that are planned for the future and 
contain large amounts of gap housing units, some as much as 3 500 units. The 
locations of these are shown as well. 
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Figure 22: Gap housing developments and house prices in Johannesburg 
(Sources: Map data copyrighted OpenStreetMap contributors; MDB 2013 (left); CAHF 
2015b (right)) 
 
The City of Johannesburg cannot, of course, be viewed in isolation. Three of SA’s 
eight Metropolitan Municipalities are located in Gauteng, within less than an 
hour’s drive from each other. The City of Johannesburg, City of Tshwane and 
Ekurhuleni together house one fifth of the countries’ population (Statistics SA 
2017a). There is considerable movement between these cities on a daily basis. 
Figure 3 (p. 9) shows all the Metropolitan and District Municipalities in Gauteng. 
There are gap housing developments all around the three Metropolitan 
Municipalities. Further investigation is required to establish how these 
municipalities interact in terms of gap housing, but that falls outside the scope of 
this report.  
Gauteng alone accounts for 35% of South Africa’s economic output (Gauteng 
Province Treasury 2014). The bulk of this is concentrated amongst the three 
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metropolitans. This would explain why some developers felt that location is not so 
important. As long as a development is within a reasonable distance of the cities, 
it should succeed. The price of land, and especially serviced land, is considerably 
more important, as echoed by almost all of the developers interviewed.  
 
5.3.3 Access to finance for developers 
 
The companies who participated in this survey noted that, although banks and 
other finance providers have very strict loan criteria, they did not struggle too 
much to access funding. However, these companies are all relatively established 
and the majority of them mentioned the good relationships they have with the 
financial institutions. A few of the smaller companies who participated mentioned 
that they only use one bank for financing, since all the finance providers have 
different criteria. The larger companies make use of a wider spread of finance 
sources.  
It is clear from the interviews that established developers are of the opinion that 
emerging developers have a much harder time accessing finance. One developer 
in particular noted how the bank they use for development finance only has about 
six developers on their books. This particular bank sees their exposure to the gap 
market as sufficient and would not easily consider lending to an emerging 
developer they do not know.  
Developers also have to put down a significant portion of their own money before 
financial institutions would consider giving development funding. For small and 
emerging developers, this can often be a stumbling block. The older, more 
established companies have often built up large reserves and can afford to put 
down larger sums of money and are more easily able to absorb shocks from 
changes in the market and poor decisions.  
In an interview with Property24 (2014), Gary Palmer, CEO of Paragon Lending 
Solutions, stated that banks were wary of residential developers following the 
credit recession of 2008-2009, mainly due to bad debt that had been accumulated 
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during the recession. Instead, they opted to lend to developers operating in the 
commercial market, which was seen as having lower risk. Palmer states that in the 
year or two prior to 2014, the focus had started to shift back towards the 
residential market.  
Mphigalale (2015) notes that emerging developers in Gauteng struggle 
considerably with accessing development finance. They feel that banks have 
overly strict lending criteria and that the state should intervene somehow to assist 
them. However, these strict lending criteria is probably in place to guard financial 
institutions from lending to inexperienced developers with unproven track 
records.  
The state does play a role in providing funding to developers, although at a much 
smaller scale than is preferable. The National Urban Reconstruction and Housing 
Agency (NURCHA) was established in 1995 as a fund that could bridge the 
financing gap between banks and poor South Africans with regards to accessing 
funding for housing (NURCHA 2016a). As a state-owned enterprise, it has 
changed over the years into an organization that aims to provide financing to 
developers and contractors in the subsidy and affordable housing market (ibid.). 
They do, however, have a shortage of funding available, which they state is a 
major challenge to their business (Khathi 2010). Although NURCHA tries to 
focus on the lower end of the market, only 10% of the value of their loan book 
went towards gap housing in the 2015/2016 financial year. A further 53% went to 
affordable housing and the remaining 37% went towards sectional title units 
(NURCHA 2016b). Only one of the developers who participated mentioned 
making use of NURCHA funding. However, this was a well-established company 
with more than 20 years of experience.  
 
5.3.4 Issues with FLISP and accessing mortgage finance 
 
A number of developers stated that they have, in the past, had issues with the 
FLISP subsidies from an administrative point of view. Applications take 
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excessively long to process. It must be noted that some improvement in recent 
years was reported. However, judging by the number of FLISP subsidies budgeted 
for by the government (see p. 80), it begs the question whether the NHFC is 
prepared to deal with the increased number of applications that can be expected in 
the next few years.  
Developers stated that the majority of FLISP applicants are successful. This is due 
to stringent checking by developers and the fact that mortgage finance must 
already have been acquired by the time of application. Applicants are 
considerably less likely to have their application for mortgage finance turned 
down. According to Eighty20 (2015) the most common reasons for banks to 
decline mortgage applications was an unacceptable credit record. A lack of 
affordability was only the second most common reason. In 2012, if you earned 
between R10 000 and R15 000, your chance of getting a mortgage application 
approved would have been 19% at FNB and 25% at ABSA (Eighty20 2015). 
There are alternative finance models available, although no developers made 
mention of alternative financing being used by their customers. Smit (1999) 
pointed out at the end of the 20th century already that mortgage finance for lower 
income groups have not been successful in SA. He states that the products aren’t 
suited for the needs of lower income households and they don’t fit the risk profiles 
accepted by the traditional credit providers. This could explain, to some degree at 
least, why so few mortgages are awarded to lower income earners. Smit (1999) 
recommended investigating the use of microloans to service the housing needs of 
the lower income groups.  
In the years following Smit’s article, there have been numerous attempts to 
introduce microfinance as a vehicle to access housing in SA (Kihato 2014). South 
Africa does have numerous micro lenders and even some microfinance products 
aimed specifically at housing, but there is significant evidence that shows the 
portion of the market it covers is relatively small (compared to mortgage 
products) and that it’s use is mainly aimed at incremental housing improvements, 
rather than new acquisitions (Gardner 2013; Kihato 2014). 
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5.3.5 Issues faced by emerging developers 
 
All of the issues discussed thus far are applicable to both established and 
emerging developers, but there are issues that affect emerging developers more. 
Unfortunately, only established developers were interviewed as part of this study. 
However, they do interact frequently with emerging developers and have 
significant insight into the issues faced by emerging developers.  
As stated in Section 5.3.3 access to finance, and particularly development finance, 
is difficult for emerging developers. This makes sense, since banks want to limit 
their exposure and would rather lend to developers they know. NURCHA is 
supposed to assist emerging developers, but their exposure to the gap and 
affordable markets are limited in practice.  
Emerging developers also don’t always have the skills in place to develop 
successfully. Developments are highly influenced by the costs of labour, materials 
and delays with approvals and emerging developers are often ill-prepared to deal 
with financial shocks. 
 
5.3.6 Possible interventions that could assist scaling up housing delivery 
 
A number of different interventions were proposed by developers that would help 
the gap housing market. Some suggestions were aimed at the supply side and 
seeks to help developers to deliver either more, or less expensive housing. Others 
are aimed at the demand side and can assist buyers to more easily access housing 
finance. These were discussed in Section 4.5 and are summarised below: 
a) Increasing the upper income limit of the FLISP subsidy 
b) Subsidised bulk service contributions 
c) Streamline the processes at council 
d) Lower interest rates and relax lending criteria 
e) Educate consumers on good credit behaviour 
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These suggestions are discussed below, followed by some suggestions from other 
sources. 
 
a) Increasing the upper income limit of the FLISP subsidy 
Some developers mentioned that the industry will be assisted if the upper income 
limit were increased to R18 000 (or even more) as have been proposed. However, 
although this proposal will be beneficial to both developers and the upper end of 
the gap market, it will do little to assist the lower income groups stuck in the 
‘unserviceable’ gap market (as shown in Figure 19, p.77). 
Figure 23 shows the affordability of a mortgage against income, complemented 
with the current FLISP subsidy. Two alternative proposals for FLISP are shown 
as well. The green line shows the affordability for a FLISP subsidy with an 
increased upper income limit of R18 000. The FLISP subsidy value of R20 000-
R87 000 is spread over the increased income range. As can be seen, this option 
would reduce the income required to afford a R400 000 house from R14 300 
(current FLISP subsidy) to R13 800. The drawback of this option is that it the 
state would effectively be subsidising the higher incomes more than the lower 
incomes groups.  
An alternative is proposed with the yellow line. This shows the current FLISP 
income ranges, but with the subsidy amount for the lowest income earners 
increased from R87 000 to R130 000, and for the upper earners from R20 000 to 
R30 000. This similarly reduces the income required for a R400 000 house to 
R13 700, but with the drawback that the state will be spending more money on the 
upper income groups.  
The issue with both alternatives is that the added benefit in both cases only affects 
a small portion of the gap market and will be insufficient to properly address the 
problems in the market on its own.  
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Figure 23: Affordability of mortgages with various FLISP subsidy proposals 
 
 
b) Subsidised bulk service contributions 
As noted in Section 5.3.1, the size and calculation method used for bulk service 
contributions is an issue of contestation. Municipalities should aim to simplify 
their calculation methods and standardise across municipalities.  
Furthermore, Gey van Pittius (2017) proposes that a bulk service subsidy should 
be introduced. Fully-subsidised houses should have their bulk services fully 
subsidised, while gap house developers should receive at least a partial bulk 
service subsidy.  
If a bulk service subsidy of the same size of the FLISP subsidy is introduced as a 
replacement for the FLISP subsidy, it would not make any difference to the end 
user. Although the price of a house should come down by the bulk service subsidy 
amount, the amount of mortgage finance required remains unchanged. 
Furthermore, implementing a sliding bulk service subsidy amount would probably 
be more difficult to administer.  
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Introducing a bulk service subsidy to compliment the FLISP subsidy would be 
beneficial to both developers and their clients, but it is unlikely that the state 
would be able to afford such an intervention, since debt levels in municipalities 
continue to rise (Infrastructure Dialogue 2015). It would make more sense for 
municipalities to work on reducing bulk service contribution costs by focussing 
on introducing more effective solutions.  
 
c) Streamline municipal processes 
A number of developers mentioned that some municipalities take excessively long 
to give projects approval. This makes it difficult for land developers who need to 
take out large sums of money to buy and service land. The longer the approval 
processes take, the more they have to spend on interest accrued. This hits 
emerging developers especially hard and the extra cost paid to interest gets 
directly carried over to the cost of land and ultimately the end-user cost of the 
house. Municipalities should aim to streamline approval processes and possibly 
look at prioritising gap housing developments. 
 
d) Lower interest rates and relaxed lending criteria 
One developer proposed that relaxed lending criteria and lower interest rates 
would help their clients to more easily access funding. Many of their clients fail to 
acquire mortgage finance from the traditional providers and consequently cannot 
afford a new house.  
Access to housing finance in the lower income markets is a worldwide problem 
and many solutions have been proposed. As discussed in Chapter 2, South African 
banks have had a contentious relationship with lower income markets and it is 
unlikely that they would change their ways. Even the introduction of the FSC in 
2004 delivered only limited results. 
Theoretically, lowering the interest rates charges to clients can substantially 
increase their ability to afford new housing as is shown in Figure 7 (p. 31). Banks 
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should be encouraged to either give lower interest rates to their gap housing 
clients, or should investigate developing other, more suitable credit products.  
Some developers mentioned that banks have overly strict lending criteria for 
people in the gap market. This could not be verified. However, as shown in Figure 
8 (p. 33) lower income households in Gauteng have lower debt levels than their 
higher income counterparts. Therefore, an applicant in the gap market should 
theoretically have a better chance of accessing mortgage finance. 
 
e) Educate consumers on good credit behaviour 
Some developers mentioned that some of their potential clients have poor 
knowledge of good credit behaviour. Figure 8 (p. 33), mentioned above, contrasts 
this view to some extent. Although the South African debt to income ratio is 
relatively low compared to more developed nations (South African Reserve Bank 
2017; Fin24 2015), almost 50% of households are in arrears with their debt. 
Educating people about good credit behaviour will not only be help them to better 
access gap housing mortgage finance, but finance in general, across all income 
levels.  
 
f) Other interventions 
According to the FFC (2013), investment incentives such as tax rebates can be a 
good way to stimulate additional funding for housing. Furthermore, possible value 
added tax (VAT) reliefs for new developments can significantly reduce the costs 
of new developments. VAT is not included when purchasing an existing house 
(BizCommunity 2017). The developers did not mention any of these 
interventions, but it might be able to assist them and their client and should be 
investigated further.  
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5.4 The role of private companies in providing housing to their 
employees 
 
Developers were asked whether they know of companies who assist their 
employees in accessing gap housing, either using their corporate social 
investments or using other means.  However, this question was not answered as 
was hoped. With the exception of large mining houses, developers knew of very 
few companies who assist their employees in accessing gap housing. Also, the 
answers were contradictory to some extent. Some developers felt that small 
companies were more likely to assist their employees, while others felt that large 
corporates are more likely.  
Petersen (2009) notes how Tongaat Hulett, a large agri-processing company 
owning 14 000 Ha of land in KwaZulu Natal, sold of a portion of their land to the 
eThekweni Municipality and assisted them in developing low cost housing. With 
the exception of large mining corporations, this is the only evidence that could be 
found of a private company, who operates outside of the built environment, being 
actively involved in providing housing for the surrounding community.  
Former Minister of Finance, Nhlanhla Nene (2015) mentioned a tax incentive that 
was introduced to incentivise businesses to assist their employees in accessing 
housing. An employer willing to provide a repayable loan to an employee, 
specifically to access low-cost, gap or affordable housing, can get back 10% of 
the outstanding loan amount at the end of the year from the South African 
Revenue Service.  
Overall, the quality of answers to questions about the role of private companies in 
providing houses were disappointing. It might be that the questions were not 
structured well enough and were misunderstood. Furthermore, some developers 
came across as having lost interest or being in a hurry when they answered these 
questions, since they were last in line.  
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5.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has aimed to discuss the data that was gathered from interviews and 
presented in Chapter 4, with the aim of answering the research questions. It was 
found that developers have a good reason for being optimistic about the gap 
market in Johannesburg. The market is very large and has been the best 
performing residential market in recent years in terms of growth and value. 
Although some developers exhibited scepticism about the sustainability of the 
FLISP subsidy, government has budgeted for high numbers of subsidies to be 
awarded in the next few years. Developers are aware that they are only able to 
service the top end of the gap market and feel that sectional title developments 
and the second hand market should rather be utilised to address the lower end of 
the gap market.  
There are numerous issues with the development processes that drive up the cost 
of houses. The main issue is the cost of bulk service contributions. The 
availability and location of land is an issue, but not as much as was expected. This 
is mainly due to the Johannesburg’s proximity to other large urban centres. 
Finance can be difficult to access and even more so for emerging developers.  
There is not a lot of evidence that suggests that other companies use their CSI or 
other mechanisms to assist their employees to access gap housing. The final 
chapter presents a conclusion to the study. 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter aims to present a number of remarks to conclude the study. A brief 
summary is given of the study and the research method used followed by a section 
presenting the key findings of the report. The next section discusses 
recommendations into what can be done to improve the gap market, for 
developers, the state, and clients. To end off, some recommendations for future 
research are presented.  
South Africa’s housing market is severely fragmented and the legacy of apartheid 
can still be seen in the housing market today. To address the housing backlog of 
1.5 million houses at the end of apartheid, the state introduced a large fully 
subsidised housing scheme, aimed at the lowest income earners. The state should 
be applauded for the three million houses they have built in the 23 years since.  
As SA’s economy grew, a gap formed in the market, with people too rich to 
access fully subsides housing and too poor to access conventional housing on the 
open market, being left with few choices. Government introduced a subsidy, 
called FLISP, in 2005, aimed at addressing the gap in the market. Uptake of the 
subsidy was poor and it was revised to its current state in 2012. Adoption of the 
subsidy has grown in recent years, but it is still being underutilized.  
The private sector is responsible for the bulk of housing delivery in SA, although 
it tends to focus on the higher end of the market. Banks have, in recent years, 
increased their exposure to the gap and affordable markets, but accessing 
mortgage credit in the gap market remains difficult.  
This study was concerned with establishing the role of the private sector in 
delivering houses in the gap market in Johannesburg. Although numerous 
developers work in the gap market in Johannesburg and they deliver roughly 2000 
units per year, they are still delivering considerably less than what the market 
requires.  
A qualitative study was done whereby developers were interviewed to establish 
what role they play in the market, what they see as issues in the market, what their 
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perception is of the market and how they think private companies can assist in 
providing housing to their employees. The key findings of the research is 
presented in the next section. 
 
6.1 Key findings 
 
The study revealed the role played by the private sector in the gap market in 
Johannesburg. It also answered the research main and sub-questions presented in 
the beginning of the report. The key findings that emanate from the report are as 
follows: 
 The gap market in Johannesburg is very large with roughly 385 000 
households, or one quarter of cities’ households. There is a shortage of 
about 130 000 units in the gap market range. 
 Roughly 14 300 households (11%) of these households can afford to buy a 
new house.  
 Numerous private developers operate in the gap market in the City of 
Johannebsurg, but they are only able to deliver roughly 2000 houses per 
year.  As stated by the CAHF (2015c), the rate of delivery of new gap 
houses is much lower than the demand would suggest is commercially 
possible. This low rate of delivery puts upwards pressure on house prices.  
 Although developers are aware of the shortcomings of the FLISP subsidy, 
they are optimistic about the gap market and its future. However, the 
environment is not conducive to delivering units at a large scale. 
 The FLISP market forms part of the gap market and the subsidy is useful 
for accessing housing in the gap market. However, only the top end of the 
FLISP market can use the subsidy to access new housing.   
 The whole gap market can theoretically access housing on the second hand 
market using FLISP. However, relatively few units are available at the 
lower end of the scale and getting access to credit is difficult. If the upper 
income limit of the FLISP subsidy is not increased soon, the subsidy will 
become obsolete in the new house market within the next few years.  
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 Numerous factors make developing in the gap market difficult. Bulk 
service contribution are too expensive and there is uncertainty about how 
it’s calculated. Furthermore, municipalities don’t all use the same methods 
to calculate contributions.  
 The housing delivery chain is not streamlined. It can take a number of 
years before for a project to go from the planning stage to final delivery of 
developments. It is especially the approval processes of city councils that 
take long. Holding costs and the associated interest can drive up the prices 
of houses considerably.  
 Funding is difficult to acquire, especially for emerging developers. Delays 
and uncertainty make it difficult for small developers to enter the market. 
They do not have the financing available to carry them through delays and 
they struggle to access funding due risks relating to their perceived 
inexperience and unproven project management track records. 
 The cheapest new house developers can build in Johannesburg is 
R400 000, accessible only to those earning more than R14 300. The FLISP 
subsidy is, in practice, only able to assist the higher end of the gap market. 
The lower end, earning less than R14 300, cannot afford a new house. 
 FLISP subsidies are primarily used for freehold title properties, which is 
not sustainable. More sectional title properties should be bought with 
FLISP subsidies. 
 Traditional mortgage products are not suitable for the lower end of the gap 
market. Interest rates are simply too high. 
 Gap housing developments in Johannesburg are mainly found on the 
municipal boundary, either just inside or just outside.  
 It is not common for private companies to assist their employees to access 
gap housing, either by using their CSI or by other means.  
Overall, developers are optimistic about the gap market and are eager to assist the 
government to deliver more. However, there are numerous factors prohibiting 
them from delivering more units. To conclude, Harry Gey van Pittius (2017), 
Chairman of SAARDA and a private developer, stated the following: 
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“We are ready and waiting to assist the government in housing delivery” 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
 
The gap market in SA and Johannesburg is large and promising, and yet 
developers struggle to deliver sufficient housing stock. A number of 
recommendations can be made to assist with problems currently experienced on 
both the demand and supply side of the market.  
Firstly, Venter (2015) states that 20% of the gap market consists of civil servants. 
The Government Employees Housing Scheme, launched in 2016, should be used 
to provide low cost loans to civil servants en-masse. This would then leave more 
funds and resources for the remaining gap market. 
Secondly, as shown in Chapter 2, the interest rate charged can play a significant 
role in the affordability of a loan. The Human Settlements Development Bank, 
announced earlier in 2017, should be opened as soon as possible and could be 
used to provide low-cost mortgage finance to the section of the gap market not 
covered by the Government Employees Housing Scheme, although questions 
should be asked about how the Government will be able to afford this. 
Thirdly, the FLISP subsidy should be adjusted somehow to benefit the lower end 
of the market more. In its current form, only the upper end of the market benefits 
from the subsidy. These intervention will all assist on the demand side of the 
market. 
Households should also be encouraged to save. A 10% saving contribution 
towards the cost of a house can greatly affect a household’s ability to afford a 
loan.  
The secondary market should be promoted by prioritising the backlog in title deed 
transfers. Social housing should also more actively be used to assist at the lower 
end of the market. Linking the FLISP subsidy to other financing models, such as 
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pension-backed loans, should be explored, especially to benefit the lower end of 
the gap market.  
On the supply side, developers should be encouraged to develop higher density 
housing units. Freehold titles are overly expensive and adds to the sprawling 
nature of South African cities.  
Municipalities should also be encouraged to revise, simplify and possibly 
subsidise their bulk service contribution costs. Higher density developments 
should also lower these costs, which will ultimately make developments more 
affordable. 
Emerging developers should be assisted to access affordable finance more easily. 
An established organization, such as Nurcha, can be used to assist. All of the 
abovementioned interventions can help create an environment where developers 
can deliver more units at more affordable rates.  
 
6.3 Recommendations for future research 
 
With the experience gathered from doing this research, a number of 
recommendations for future research are presented. Johannesburg is situated in 
close proximity to the large metropolitans of the City of Tshwane and Ekurhuleni. 
Although this study focused mainly on gap housing in the City of Johannesburg, 
the City cannot be seen in isolation and it is recommended that the role of private 
developers in Gauteng Province is investigated in more detail as well. More 
information is required with regards to how the cost of land and bulk service 
contributions differ between the cities.  
The size of the gap market in Johannesburg was estimated very roughly. It is 
recommended that a more detailed method be developed to accurately estimate the 
size of the market. Furthermore, the size of the market should be broken down 
more finely by income group so that the number of households who can afford 
new house can be estimated more accurately. 
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The study was mainly concerned with new freehold title houses. This approach to 
housing is not affordable or sustainable and is in direct contrast with the principle 
of densification. Time and effort should rather be spent to research how so-called 
RES 3 developments can be used to fill the gap in the market.  
South Africa’s metropolitans all have their own unique characteristics and 
housing issues. It would be interesting to know if the results from this study can 
also be applied to the other cities and smaller towns in the country. 
This report only consulted private property developers to find out what their role 
is in providing gap housing in Johannesburg. Further study is recommended to 
also find out what the City is doing to remove the backlog and how they view the 
gap market.  
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Appendix B – Participant consent form 
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Appendix C – Interview questionnaire 
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Research Questionnaire: 
 
Company: ……………………………………………….. 
Date: …………………………………………………… 
Time: …………………………………………………….. 
Location:…………………………………………………. 
Participants:……………………………………………………………… 
Title of research: The role of the private sector in providing gap housing in 
Johannesburg 
 
[Introduction of myself, project, methodology, data handling, data storage] 
 
INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS 
Question 1 How long have you worked for [Company name]? 
Answer 1  
Question 2 What is your role in the organization 
Answer 2  
Question 3 Do you know how long the company has existed? 
Answer 3  
Question 4 Has the company always been called [Company name]? If not, 
what was it previously called? 
Answer 4  
THE GAP MARKET 
Question 5 How do you define the gap market? By income, or house cost? 
What is that income/cost bracket? 
Answer 5  
Question 6 You do developments in the RDP/gap/affordable market. Who is 
your typical client and how do you identify the market that you 
operate in?  
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Answer 6  
Question 7 Have you always been involved in this market, or have you only 
recently entered? 
Answer 7  
Question 8 Do you do land developments, top structure developments, or 
both? 
Answer 8  
Question 9 What is the perception of your company of the gap market in 
Johannesburg? Do you see the market as growing? 
Answer 9 
 
 
Question 
10 
What determines the location of your projects? It seems to be 
mainly on the peripheries of the city? Is this purely because of 
cost of land, or are there other reasons? 
Answer 10 
 
 
Question 
11 
What does your company see as barriers to entering or expanding 
in the market? 
Answer 11 
 
 
Question 
12 
How many projects have you delivered that involves gap 
housing? Value of the projects? How many units built? Typical 
prices of the units? (In total and recently, if possible?) 
Answer 12  
Question 
13 
How are your houses marketed and sold? Is this done internally 
or do you make use of estate agents? 
Answer 13  
Question 
14 
Are your developments aimed at a specific income group, or are 
they mixed income developments? Do you do any developments 
that are mixed with fully subsidised/RDP/BNG type units? Are 
any of your projects internally cross-subsidized? 
Answer 14  
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Question 
15 
Are you involved in any public-private partnerships? Why? Or 
why not? 
Answer 15  
Question 
16 
How do you fund your projects? Through the big 5 banks? Or are 
there other institutions involved? 
Answer 16  
Question 
17 
How do you fund bulk infrastructure? Do you get government 
assistance in any way? Or is the infrastructure cost included in the 
house price? 
Answer 17  
Question 
18 
From looking at the size of typical developments containing gap 
housing, it looks like the market is more beneficial to larger 
developers. Is this the case? Why do you think this is? Is it purely 
scale that makes it worthwhile, or are there others factors as well? 
Answer 18  
Question 
19 
On both a national and provincial level, the uptake of FLISP 
subsidies has not reached the targets set. Is there a shortage of 
supply? Or is it a lack of access to credit? Or are people too 
uninformed about the subsidy? What is your take on this?  
Answer 19  
Question 
20 
The FLISP subsidy was widened to include households earning 
up to R15000 in 2012. Furthermore, the house cost ceiling of 
R300 000 was lifted and the subsidy was allowed for all houses, 
not only new ones. This not only allows more people access to 
the subsidy, but also potentially increases the client bases for 
developers. What else can be done by government/DoHS to 
incentivise more activity in the market from the private sector? 
Answer 20  
Question 
21 
Are there any private companies out there who you know are 
involved with assisting their employees in acquiring gap housing? 
To what extent are they involved? Do you think there is a case to 
be made to use CSI initiatives to assist employees with housing?  
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Answer 21  
 Thank you for your time. It’s much appreciated. 
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